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Nigeria, a country cf great importance to US int = r«rsts,
facss many challenges in the 1980»s, The survival cf this
stra teg icallv important naticn may be dependent upon its
ability to manage and control the forces currently at work
Trying zo dismember the growing unity of its people. Three
potential forces for change - Islam, ethnicity, and the
economy - are discussed and the most likely vehicle for
peaceful, urcgressiva change, is analyzed.
While facing its many challenges the eni£rgenc<= cf a
constitutional government, steadily gaining in strength, may
provide Nigeria's best hope for peaceful evolution and
significant development in the 1980's.
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I. U.S. CONCERNS IN NIGERIA
Demoqraohically , Nigeria is ona of the largest ccun~ries
in sub-Sahara Africa with the largest popula-ion, sstima-:=?d
at b?tw5€n 80 and 100 million people. By virtue of the
discovery of larae, high quality, crude oil deposits and the
evolution of a relatively stable government Nigeria has
gained seme ore-eminence within African politics and has
displayed an ability to control, in some degreee, her own
developmental processes.
J- is becauss of Nigeria's size, oil, government and
relative stability th=t -he US has become concerned with Her
growth and has displayed an interest in the areas of
economic and, specifically, oil development and the progress
of Nigeria's governmental processes (to include the Nigerian
military and Nigeria's conduct of foreign politics).
A. THE ECOSOHY
Economics and trade provide the foundation for carren-^
O.S. /Niqerian relations. This relationship is centered,
primarily, en Nigeria's crude oil deposits. The US is the
maior fcreian market for Nigeria's oil ana Nigeria ranks
second only to Saudi Arabia as the most important supplier
of petrol€Uia to the IS, Nigeria provides, approximately, 15
percent of total US oil consumption and US oil imports
r^^cressnt U6 oercent cf Nigeria's exports (with no alterna-
^.ive market in the n=ar future). This interdependence has
fosterel seme misunderstandings in US/Nigerian relation-
ships. Four of the lost critical misunderstandings follow
and provide the caraaeters around which US policy toward
Nigeria has been formulated.

The most ssricus misunderstanding centers arcund how
far Nigeria will go in using its oil as a lev-^r to
pressure acticn on South Africa. Nigeria's l^verag?
is tied directly tc it.s oil exports, however, this
leverage has rapidly waned in conjunction with the
current oil glut and Nigeria's recurring develop-
mental crises. The US, while tending to overstate its
relative advantage towards Nigeria {by representing
U6 percent of her total exports) must also recognize
Niceria as an honest broker in African affairs and
cul-iva^e a policy which appreciates Nigeria's status
while oreserving US foreign policy goals.
A second misunderstanding concerns whether or net
Nigeria is an oil rich nation with a talented popula-
tion or a very poor nation with a large and growing
population and rapidly dwindling non-renewable
resources. The US view is that Nigeria is flush with
oil and petro -dollar s and should pay, in full, for
whatever it wants from the US. Nigeria argues that it
is a poor country, eligible for aid. However, as a
member of OPEC, Nigeria is (by US law) ineligible for
concessional as opposed to fully reimbursable assis-
tance. While fully 90 percent of Nigerian exports are
in petroleum products they must simultaneously import
ever $2 billion of food stuffs annually. Attempts by
Niceria tc rebuild its agricultural sector have
failed in large part because the programs are tied to
3il exports, an inherently unstable resource upon
which to :eg development. It appears that the US can
excect schisms in relations with Nigeria if a policy
of aid and assistance is not adopted. [1] Nigeria has
demonstrated a sufficient ambiguity in East-West
affairs and possesses the necessary political expe-
diency tc seek Eastern dIoc assistance if that is all
that remains available.

The rich vs poor misur. dsrstanding is related tc the
huqs US deficit in its trade with Niqeria. The US
would like to see Nigeria rapidly increase its
government and private sector purchases from th? US
while Niaeria prefers to bay and sell froin all
ccmers, while at the same time encouraging US firns
-c invest, particularly in agribusiness. Nigeria has
surpassed Japan as the principal source of the
overall US visible trade deficit. As a result of
these growing economic ties a series cf high-level
bilateral talks, between the US and Nigeria, have
be?n hald since 1977. In September, 1981, Vice
President George Bush hosted Vice President Ekwueme
and the Nigerian delegation daring the sixth session.
"These bilateral meetings have provided opportuni": ies
to discuss closer cooperation in agriculture, energy,
science and technology, health, trade and investnent,
and education and have resulted in soitie specific
aareem=nts. " [2] As a part of an understanding on
agricultural cooperation, the Joint Agricultural
Consultative Committee, composed cf public and
crivate sector representatives, was established, in
1980, to tromote private sactor agricultural invest-
ment. A high level US trade mission led by Secretary
cf Commerce, Malcolm Baldridge, and Secretary of
Agriculture, Jchn R. Block, visited Nigieria in early
1982. Ccmcrising senior executives of about twenty
five US corporations, the mission explored the possi-
bilities for increased economic cooperation between
the United States and Nigeria. One further example of
growing economic ties between the US ana Nigeria was
the establishment, in 1982, of a US-Nigerian Business
Council.

4. Finally, the US would like Nigeria to maintain high
production rates of its quality crude and charga
prices below OPEC minimums. Nigeria would lika to do
the oDDosite. Nigeria's price cuts in early 1983 did
net represent an attempt by Nigeria to become an OPEC
dissident, rather the cuts represented an attempt to
survive a world oil glut, lower North Sea oil prices,
and a general productivity cut that threatened to
undermine the fabric of Nigeria's national economic
structure. At the time of the cuts Nigeria was
producing oil at a rate of less than 5 00,003 bpd.
Most Nigerian government authorities concluded that a
minimum of 1 million bpd needed to b-:^ produced just
to meet the balance of payments schedule.
Furthermore, Nigeria's oil production and price
fixing is closely tied to two over-riding factors. 1)
Nigerian crude oil is of the finest quality in the
world (due to its low sulfur content) and costs from
three to seven times more to extract than that of
other OPEC countries. 2) Nigeria has pegged its
Fourth National Development plan to p3 trc-dollars
based on oil production of 2.23 million bpd at $36.00
DGi barrel. Nigeria's recent price cuts to S30.00 par
barrel, while increasing production to the required
OPEC minimum of 1.3 million bpd, has severely damp-
ened the optimistic outlook portrayed in the
1S81-1995 Fourth Development Plan.
B. NIGSHIAN S07EBNaENT, MILITARI, AND FOREIGN POLICY
The 1979 Nigsrian Constitution vras brought into force by
the Federal Military Government (FMG) as an ordinary dscree,
entitled the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(enactment) Decree of 1978, nu!!ib3r 25, taking effect on 1

October, 1979. In a departure from its British fcrerur.ners
the new ccnstitution adopted features of the United S-.at3s
constitution - "The establishment of a governmental system
predicated en a popularly elected president at the head of a
strong executive branch and a separate bicameral
legislature . " C 3
]
Although, the Nigerian political framework bears a
marked resemblance tc the federal sys-era of the United
States, the institutions the republic has adopted carry -he
imprint cf its own unique experiences and needs (See
appendix A for aovernmental structure). The president is
intentionally delegated strong executive powers and special
conditions attached tc his election are intended to insure
that he will be more than a regional candidate, while his
cabinet must, by constitutional direction, include ministers
reoresentina all nineteen states.
The 1979 elections represented the first test of
Nigeria's new system and despite some vestiges cf ethno-
regional politics which had plagued Nigeria in the past they
had tc be termed a success. The next test cf Nigeria's
svstero tcck place in August 1983, when Nigerians voted for
the second time in a national election. The inherent insta-
bility created by national elections in third world coun-
tries oosed a serious threat to Nigerian unity particularly
when comccunded by eccncmic difficulties and internal unrest
soarked by dissident student groups and rival religious
factions. The world anxiously awaited the outcome of this
most critical test cf Nigerian continuity. It now appears
that the 1983 election was a complete success and, although
marred by some political bitterness and factional
infighting, can only serve to strengthen the democratic
political process which continues to grow in Nigeria.
10

1 • Siis Miiii-§II
Kilitarily, Nigeria is without peer in west Africa
and is qenerally recognized as a potentially dominant mili-
tary force in sub-Sahara Africa. Although, not inclined to
use its military, Nigerian forces have served with distinc-
tion on numerous United Nations peacekeeping forces and was
instrumental in establishing the ill fated OAU peacekeeping
force in Chad which failed in 1981. Certainly its size,
population, and military strength mark Nigeria as an
impcsinq reaional force in west Africa.
Historically, Nigeria has taken a concilatory and
passive view of most foreign policy matters not involving
Africa. Niaeria is k«en for arbitration and comprcmiss and
not for armed conflict. However, tnat Nigeria is pi'T-pared to
defend itself and its African allies is evidenced oy its
recent military expenditures program projected at *6.4
billion through 1985, and its continuing efforts at force
modern izaticn and self sufficiency in technical training.
Ir. January, 1931, Nigeria announced a five year
dev= Icoment olan which included, "the modernization of its
armed forces to make Nigeria's army tne best in Africa and
com: arable to the best in the world." Of particular core am
for Nigeria is Libya's aggression into Chad whicn occured in
both 1980 and 19S3. Increased defense expenditures may also
he seen by the country's rulers as politically advisable,
"In as much as it might be expected to keep the soldiers
ccn-.cn-ed, deflect r«=bell:Lon, and enhance Nicaria's self-
imare and reoutation as a major continental power." ['4]
2. The Conduct of Niaeria^s International Rala*^ ions
Nigeria roaintd-ns an ambiguous strategic outlook by
fcsterinq relations with both the aast and west. Since th=
civil war Niaeria has remained strongly non-aligned giving
11

no pref-srred status to (JS or Soviet interests. Scmstimes
considered a leftist oriented country, this inisp«= rcept ion
springs from the civil war when Nigeria was forced to buy
weapons from the Soviets (after OS and European sources
failed to cocoerate) . The Soviets percieved this action as
indication of closer ties. The Nigerian government saw it as
stricTlv a cash deal with no implication of further comiritt-
ment. This idea of cash deals and non-alliance has remained
an integral oart cf Nigerian foreign policy had has
increased as their ability to buy with petro-dollars has
increased. Nigeria's unpre dicability is a matter of policy,
a delib-^^rate oosture designed to show both East and West
that Nirjerian friendship cannot be taken fcr granted. Thus,
while condemning the Soviets for their invasion cf
Afganistan rhey also attended the 1980 Olympics in defiance
of the US boycott. This deliberate ambiguity has left
neither of the two world powers sure of Nigeria's loyalty,
ccc.^eraticn , or hcstility.
In October, 1979, Nigerian President Shagari
addressed the UN General Assembly and reinforcad the impor-
tance of Africa and Nigeria by saying, "The probleiis cf no
ether continent define the international agenda better than
those of Af rica .. . . The destiny cf Nigeria is inextricably
linked with the fortunes of all the countries of Africa."
[5] This statement serves to illustrate Nigeria's feeling
that wi-hin the international frameworl^ Africa is the most
crucial actor and Nigeria is the most important actor within
Africa.
Having stated the importance of Nigeria and Africa
in the international arena Nigeria has net failed to recog-
nize at l€ast three ether kay international actors. First,
the US, who is their na:nber one oil customer. Second, the
Soviet 'Jnicn, because of their military strength and ability
to -rcjec-^ themsrlves into African states. Third, the EEC,
due to close trade relations and historical ties.
12

Nigeria views the international distribution of
power in a cractical sense noting that the tJS and' ths fJSSR
are the two nations most capable of interference in African
develconient . To the western world and to Nigeria, oil is the
sincfle most important source of Nigerian leadership both
within Africa and within the in-ernarioinal community.
Nigeria is a "Price Hawk" among OPEC nations (mostly due to
her need to mairtain oil production in the face of growing
internal cevelopment problems, as was recently demonstrated
by Nigeria's oil orice reductions in the face cf serious
OPEC dissen*) and has used cil as a linkage issue in the
South African situation. Nigeria's willingness to use oil as
a weapon to force concessions has been demonstrated on at
least three occassions. 1) By expropriating British Oil in
1970. 2) When it withheld shipments to Ghana to protest the
execution cf former leaders. 3) When they stopped cil
supplies to Chad to pretest the failure- cf their peace
keeping efforts -^rior to the intervention of Libya. It is
clear that should the issue merit such action Nigeria is
pra.ared-to use cil as a political sanction. However, it is
egually clear that Nigeria does not possess the capability
to seriously threaten the cil flow to the US as it has
threatered to do in the wake of the continuing problems
stemminQ from South Africa's apartheid policy's and the US's
failure to take a clear cut stance on that issue. ^Tigeria
could net tolerate the lose of its largest custon^r and
expect to survive economically. However, as a matter of
policy the Nigerian government remains firmly committed to
the strugale for the total liberation of the continent from
tha oppression of mincrity regimes.
In sum, Nigeria has taken a defensive international
pos--ure. Threatening to use oil as a weapon and clearly
defining the cases in which that weapon might bs invoked.
Within th€ African continent Nigeria has assumed a role as
13

the "Giant" of Africa and has been instrumental in festering
African unity through its support of the OAU and similar
organizations. It is certain that if Nigeria can overcome
her internal instability and fully develop her economic




II. THE BETOR}? TO CIVILIAN ROLE
Nigeria's rezurn to civilian rule, in 1979/ launched an
experiment in democratic politics which remains an object of
keen observation by not only the CIS but also neighboring
African states and socialist influenced governments
worldwide.
While representing a strong and dedicated attempt to
bring ecfual government to a highly pluralistic society the
process cf returning to civilian rule also created several
potential sources of tension. The return to civilian rule
marked the farthest point of an experiment which began with
Britain's first colonial incursions and culminated in the
1979 elections.
A. CCLOSIAI SIGEHIA
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to recount the
entire period of Britain's colonial occupation cf Nigeria,
however, by reviewing selected historical episodes (to
include the British policy of Indirect .^ule, the
Amalgamation Process cf 1914, the rise of Nigerian na-icn-
alism constitutional evolution, and the impact of indepen-
dence) a foundation is laid which illustrates the
instability of the new governmental system now operating in
Nigeria, a foundation based on regional oiases, ethnic
competition, and British insensiti vity to the needs of a
culturally diverse, politically divergent, and loosely




• IL§ ^pnlicaticn of Indirect rule in Nigeria
Sir Frederick Lugard, like other British conquerors,
ado-^ted a colicy of ruling through the aristocracy of the
con usred people. This system, known as 'Indirect Rule, ' was
never as indirect as is commonly represented. "It was indi-
rect only as long as the traditional authority accepted the
dictate of the colonial regime." [6] Recognized as an effi-
cient and inexpensive way to govern conquered peoples Lugard
managed to -ake the process of indirect rule beyond an expe-
dient form of governorship (to overcome economic hardship
and lack of staff) to a complete philosophy of government
for Britain's colonial people. [7] Reccgnized as a cheap
policy which produced order, peace, and tranquility, indi-
rect rul€ created an air of isolation and cuirural stagna-
tion, in Northern Nigeria, which the British never fully
realized.
A number of factors ccmbinad to isolate the calip-
hate from -he great 20th century world movements. By the
middle of the 19th cantury the trans- Saharan routes began to
decline as a result cf the trade contacts opened up on the
Nigar River. [8] The net effect of this activity (designed
to open trade from the coast to the interior) combined with
the subsequ-^nt decline in the trans-S aharan trade was; that
when the Muslim world was beginning its modern transforma-
tion tha Caliohate in- northern Nigeria was beginning to lose
contact with it. The establishment of the colonial bounda-
ries [9] ccmoleted the process of isolation.
As a tart of the policy of indirect rule, the
British promised not to interfere with the .Muslim religion.
This was broadly in-terpreted by both parties to mean that
Christian missionaries would not ba encouraged "^o prosely-
tize in northern Nigeria. This increased northern Nigeria's
isolation bv causing it to miss the opportunities afforded
16

by t:h€ missionary education system. The Ycruba and subse-
quently the' Ibo populations quickly recognized the impor-
tance of western education so necessary to secure civil
service lobs and compete in a western dominated economy.
With few exceptions, the northern Nigerian education system
was still based on the old Qur'anic schools which ill
prepared its students for westernized and modernized society
and virtually precluded education for women despite Othman
dan Fodio*s reformist moves in this area. The cumulative
effect cf this isolation from the Christian missionary
education system was a lack cf trained personnel to manage
northern businesses or work in northern civil service posi-
tions. As a result cf this qualified manpower shortage a
larae southern population, comprised mainly of Ibc's,
migrated north to secure jobs which were so scarce in the
ever peculated eastern portions of Nigeria. Eventually, this
migration and the subsequent establishment of large southern
population centers, called sabon garis, cclocated with
northern cities (the largest was in Kano) was to have
serious consequences which manifested themselves in the
Nigerian Civil War.
The British never saw the problem this isolation of
the north was creating for ths day of eventual self-
government. The main British concern seemed to be northern
isQlaticii from the possible violent impact of southern views
and 'religion. However, th? southern influx cf trained
personnel was percieved as a cheap way to staff an under-
manned civil service, creating a dichotomy in Bri*:i£h inter-
ests which they apparantly failed to percieve. Thus, as the
20th century progressed, northern Nigeria became cut-off
from the Xaqhreb and middle east, and protected from
southern Nicer ian ideas and icvements. "The north presented a
picture cf tranquility strangely out of place in the general
uoheavals cf the 20th century. [10]
17

Lugard's policy of indirect rule was narrowly
percieved as a resounding success for British colonial
administration. It was efficient, cheap, and peaceful. Eased
on the Fulani Emirs feudal control over the population the
British were able to manipulate a vast area of Nigeria via
their over-riding control of relatively few leaders; leaders
who manifested intense loyalty zo the British Empire in
return for localized fower.
The British policy of indirect rule in northern
Nigeria provided a unique medium for the growth and spread
of Islam. However, it layed the groundwork for serious
social and political upheaval in the future. Among the most
ccnseguential oroblems were
:
1. A socially and economically deprived northern state,
isolated from the mainstream of Nigerian commerce.
2. A state unable to^ develop educationally at a rate
commensurate with its neighbors to the south.
3. A groundwork for future ethno-religious conflicts as
Christian Ibc's moved north to staff institutions
which northern Muslims were not prepared to staff.
u. An air of unrest as potential Islamic reformers
asserted that the traditional ruler's claim to power
lacked validity because they had subverted ^he -enets
and vcdues of Islam to their own, frequently, corrup*
purposes.
With -rhe "success" of the policy of indirect rule in
northern Nigeria the foundation was laid for the process of
Amalgamation to begin. However, as will be emphasized, the
amalgamation process was another form of economic expediency
which had the net effect cf exacerbating ethnc-regicnal




Ey 1900 ^ he irajcr areas of resistance to Briiish
authority had been overcome. Yorabaland was under treaty,
Benin had bean conquered, and the northern emirates were
firmly entrenched in the British policy of indirect rule.
Only Iboland remained fully outside of British colonial
jurisdiction and in 1902 an expedition to assert British
authority was launched. The success of the campaign was
imminent and although some parts of Iboland were not brought
under British control until 1918, "tha year 1906, when the
Lagos Protectorate was merged with the Protectorate of
Southern Nicer ia and the north was finally pacified, can bB
taken as larid-ng the beginning cf effective British adminis-
tration in modern Nigeria." [11] Up to this point, although
Nigerian's had frequent contact with Europeans, ther? had
teen very little cuturai exchange. The main British interest
had been economic and there had been no conscious effort to
al*er society "except in so far as customs hindered tirai?. "
[12]
"The ::!eriod 1S06-1912, whioh preceded the amalaama-
tion of the northern and southern protectorates, by Lugard,
is one of the most crucial in the history of Nig=^ria, for it
marks both ths beginning cf effective administration and the
fceginninq of the rejection of standards and customs that had
endured almost intac-^ for many centuries." [13] For *he
first time, Niaerians were exposed in a large measure to
wastern influences, A new economic world, Christianity,
education, and new systems of administration and justice
were all introduced. The western way of life was made avail-
abla to a wide range cf Nigerians. "So, although this period
appears from the annual reports as a static one, it was in
effect tls beginning cf silent revolution in Wigeria." flU]
19

These revolutionary forces of education, western
commerce, Christianity, and adminis-crative innovation were
let loose between 1906 and 1912 thereby, setting the stage
for Lugard, as Governor General of Nigeria, to mold the
northern and southern pro tecxorates in-o one amalgamated
state. "The decisions he made in those years were to influ-
ence the canalization of these new forces until, after the
second world war, when control was slowly taken over from
the British administration by the Nigerian nationalists
themselves." r 15 ]
As Drevicusly mentioned, amalgamation was a direct
result of economic expediency. The northern protectorate was
running at a severe deficit. Funds were being transferred
from the south to the nor-h to finance various projects and
the qcverniuent itself. This practice fostered considerable
enmity between north and south and came -o a head ever the
issue of railway construction. Although all of -he details
are impossible to recount within the confines of this paper,
suffice it to say that a railway was planned from Port
Harcourt to the interior city of Kano. [16] It became clear
to the British colonial government, that the most expedi-
tious coordination cculd be achieved through the amalgama-
tion of north and south. Basically, it was hoped that a
single adirinistrat ion would be better equipped to disperse
funds and that hostility evolving from the North's inability
to oay for itself would be assuaged.
Amalgamation was achieved on 1 January, 19 14. The
northern and sou-hern provinces of Nigeria together retained
their status as a British protectorate while lagos, the
capital, remained a British colony. Thus, for the first time
in history, a country tailed Nigeria was creat'^d.
The most crofcund aspec: of the amalgamation policy
was the continued separation of north and south. [17]
Instead cf having the two sets of societies interact, which
20

would have been fostered by full amalgamation, thay were
keot apart, t hus. continuing the isolation of the north forin
the imoact of southern economic ac-ivity, educational prog-
ress, and (more dubiously) Christian influence. British rule
in the north had already increased the tendency visible in
the 19th century, of isolating Nigerian Muslims from the
rest of Islam by stepping the trans-Saharan trade, and
although the south could not be insulated from modernizing
western influences because of its commercial position,
Lugard was largely able to prevent these influences from
flowing north. Therefore, under an amalgamated Nigeria, the
peoples remained separate though nominally under the same
government.
It was Lugard's belief that his system of indirect
rule could be adapted and modified so that it would work
anywhere. After the amalgamation of Nigeria he applied this
theory to both the Ycruba and Ibo peoples, believing that he
could find and train chiefs who could be made into the same
type of feudal autocrats whcm he had been accustomed to
using in th? north. A brief summary of the failure of this
policy amcnq the Yoruba and Ibo follows.
a. Indirect Fule in Yorubaland
In Yorubaland, tha British wanted to return to
the conditions of the 18th century and make Oyo the chief
power. On the assumption that an oba in Yorubaland resembled
an emir in the north, the British tried to govern by
controlling the obas as they did ths emirs. However, Obas in
Yorubaland were not autocratic; rather they shared power
with a numter of chiefs and maintained their power only
through the aooroval of these chiefs. When the British tried
to insure that the chiefs selected were favorable to their
policies they found that a complex system of lineages was
involved. Subsequent attempts, by the British, to bribe and
coerce the lineage groups produced confusion and resentment.
21

b. The Ibo and Indirect Rule
Just as the policy of indirect rule, imported
from the north, was unsuited for lorubaland so it was
equally unsuited for the Ibo. The core of the Ibo system was
the village assembly. A progressive British official might
have teen able tc parlay this popular system into some form
of British local government, but Lugard's notion prevailed.
It was considered essential to discover traditional authori-
ties among the Ibo.
Lugard sent an officer from the north. Lord
Palmer, tc make this discovery. Palmer identified the
lineage elders as the local authority, despite the fact that
the elder was usually no more than the spokesman for the
village meeting. Ths elders were vested with an authority
thev had never before possessed. Eventually, these elders in
a once uopular system came to be viewed by the Ibo people as
tvrants representing British rule. Resentm?nt became anger
and when discontent arose it was directed at. these "warrant
chiefs." r 18]
Meanwhile, another social development was begin-
ning tc crovide the Ibos with a means to express opposition
to British ooiicy. "Having been incorporated into an amalga-
mated Nigeria and influenced by rhe Yoruba western educated
class, the Ibo used the co- operative strength of their clans
to build schools, educate their promising sons and play cne
Christian mission off against the other to gain the greatest
benefit." [19] Eventually, the Roman Catholics eiierged as
the ECS- helpful missionary activity, thereby, securing a
paramount cosition within Ibo society. In any case, educa-
tional development was the product of Ibo local organiza-
tion, not of the British administration. "T'-eir advances
were largely brought about within 19th century social and
political institutions and not within the system which the
British were trying tc impose." [20]
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c. World War I
Much of Lugard's objective was undermined, ir.
1914, by the outbreak of war in Europe. The involvement of
Nigeria ir. World War I could not be avoided, and this m'^ant
that many Africans were taken out of their traditional soci-
eties and -^hrust into servica as soldiers for the Queen.
The Nigerians became heavily involved in fighting the
Germans in Cameroon. "Surprisingly, the war was not taken as
an occassion to throw off the colonial yoke." [21]
Significantly, there was an attempt by the Germans tc fcaient
a iihadist movement in northern Nigeria to embarrass the
Anglo-French war effort. Relying on Turkey's alliance, the
Germans felt that the Turks, as leaders of the Islamic
world, would sway Nigerian Muslims to rebel. The attempt was
a rescundinq failure as Nigerian Muslims remained staunchily
loyal to their British overlords. The reason for this
loyalty was not quite clear but probably lay with rhe reti-
cence cf northern emirs to abdicate the positions which they
held at tte disgressicn of British administrative policy.
Perhaps more significantly, for the first time,
the Nigerian people had fought and killed Europeans. The
aura cf white invincibility, cf inherent superiority, must
have bean shaken. As Lugard stated in a letter to his wife
regarding the Nigerian soldier, "H? also knows how to kill
white msn , around whom he has been taught to weave a w€b cf
sanctity cf life. He also knows how to handle bombs and
Lewis and Maxims - and he has seen white men budge when he
stocd fast. And altogether he has acquired much knowledge
which might be put to uncomfortable use some day." [22]
It seems impractical that traditional authority
could hope to retain the allegianca cf men who were mixing
with so many different nationalities and seeing so many
contrasting ways cf life.. War was bound to stimulate
powerful forces of nationalism in Africa.
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d . Su m m ar y
Begun in 1914, the Lugard amalgamation plan
resulted in the ossification of regional separatism and the
evolution of a Nigerian community which shared little in
common, other than government by Britain. Characterized by
ethnic tension, suspicion of British motives, and overt
antagonism the efforxs of Lugard and his policy were to
undarmine the fabric cf Nigerian nationalism well beyond the
day of Nigerian independence.
3. N2t45Il§i±§S §?^ Constitutional Evol utio n
The practical effects of the war experience were
seen immediately after 1918 in the growth of nationalist
sentiment. But, the dislocation caused by the war also had
its impact on British policy. Lugard* s policy represented an
attempt to reverse tfce conventional colonial principles that
had emerged from Britain's experience in its American colo-
nies. Since the 16th century Britain had found that tha
inhabitants of its colonies demanded an increasing share in
the determination of their lives. Following the American
Revolution the principle of self-determination was recog-
nized in Britain as a first priority of colonial government.
As Britain began to acquire colonial territories on
the ccast cf west Africa during the 19th century, the ques-
tion arose as to whether the concept of representative
government, which was being applied to the whire-sett led
colonies, was suitable for those in Africa.
a. The Constitution of 1922
Early on it was clear that each Bri^iish colony
would have a considerable degree of autonomous responsi-
bility, varying according to local circumstances and the
personalities of the officials concerned. The acceptance cf
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this necessity led to the creation of the kind cf councils
that had formed the foundations of representative institu-
tions in the other colonies. Thus, during the middle years
cf the 19th century, executive and legislative councils ware
established as part of the Eritish governmental structure in
west Africa.
These councils did not develop along representa-
tive lines, as had those cf the other colonies. They
consisted of officials and laymen nominated by the govern-
ment. It might have been expected that a representative
system would have developed out of this infancy - it did
not. First, because cf the trend against rhe appointment of
Africans to Dositions of responsibility that occurred toward
the end cf the century and, second, because of Lugard's
dislike of African representation. Yet even Lugard could not
prevent the progress toward representative institutions tha-
started again after the war.
The legislative ccuncii constituted in 1922 was,
probably, not a product of nationalist pressure. First, the
governor had been very critical in his references to nation-
alist activity as recently as 1920 and, two, the electoral
system had been introduced for the town council of Lagcs in
1920, before the nationalists had made their presence felt.
However, the legislative council was to include the first
directly elected Africans in British Africa, and certainly
represented a dramatic change in Brizish attitudes towards
the nationalists. "This change probably resulted from two
interrelated causes. First, the war with its rhetoric about
"self-deter oflination" had affected the climate fcr colonial
policy. And second, the changed climate cf opinion had also
influenced the British Parliament concerning the need for
some form of representative system in the colonies they
governed." f 23 ]
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The Constitution of 1922, which introduced the
legislative council, marked a new stage in Nigerian polit-
ical development. "The Nigerian Council had never been more
than a phantom institution, dcminatsd by the British govern-
ment, its Africans selected for their quiescence, its func-
tion purely advisory, and its meetings rare." [24] The new
council was a totally different kind of body and the fact
that direct elections were to be held in Lagos and Calabar
was the ccnstiturion 's most momentous feature. "The signifi-
cance of the electoral principle outweighed all reserva-
tions: it was at the proclamation of the constitution of
1922 that modern politics were born in Nigeria." [25]
The elections which took place in 1923, 1923,
and 1933 were much more significant as an outlet for polit-
ical activity than they were for their outcomes. However,
the election process continued to be confined to the cities
of Lagos and Calabar despite a promise that it would be
€Xtend€d to other areas. This provided a focus for political
agitation.
The most serious protest arose among the Ibo.
Eitterly resentful of the authority invested in the "warrant
chiefs" and hounded by taxes they considered unfair, the
Ibos rioted in 1927 and again in 1929 to protest the tax
increases. The 1929 riots were led by women who feared that
a tax was going to be extended to them which would exacer-
bate already low produce prices. Most of the violence was
directed at administrative buildings and houses of warrant
chiefs. Thirty-two people were killed [26] when police fired
into the demonstrators. Subsequent commissions of African
barristers were appointed to examine tha actions of British
officials. These appointments served to assuage some African
hostility but, "the whole affair conclusively proved that
the administration of the east and of the western areas
torderinc the east would have to be drastically changed if
further violence was to be avoided." [27]
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At this time another Bri-cish administrator,
Donald Cameroon, arrived in Nigeria from Tanganyika
(Tanzania). He quickly assessed the folly of Lugard's sepa-
ratist colicies and instituted rapid change to eleviate the
tension being created by the unworkable policies of indirect
rule. In Ycrubaland, he stopped the effort to return to the
past glories of Oyo and implemented a plan to develop a
government free from the old ways, and which Would include
educated Africans in the native authorities.
Among the Ibo, he returned to a system closely
resembling the one which Lugard had replaced and he
abolished the provincial courts while lessening the pow^r of
the native courts, "thereby doing away with the bitter crit-
icisms cf the administration cf justice that had b^-sn a
maior factor in popular resentment." [28]
He established a high court to sit for the whol<?
protectorate and abclished the systsm in which both th^
north and the south had a lieutenant governor. All cf these
actions had the dual impact cf appeasing educated Africans
and helping to reduce the separation of the two regions
(north and south).
Few other changes were made in the administra-
tion cf Nigeria before the end of World War II. Essentially,
the country remained a collection of separata communities
linked together by British rule. However, .elements were
develcpinc that were to have an influence for change. Though
some aspects of British rule had persistently separated
rather than drawn together the various communities, "colo-
nial government had in itself produced a single political
unit for the first time." [29] Although, often invisible, an
element cf national identification was induced. Educated
Africans looked toward the central government either for
their employment or for participation in decision-making.
Thev began to develop a commcn consciousness, irrespective
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of their communities or origin. Gradually, some sense of
national identity began to appear ^mong the minority of
educated elite.
"It would be a gross exaggeration to suggest
that Nigeria showed signs of becoming a modern nation-state
in the period, but between the two world wars colonial
gcvsrnaient was unconsciously providing a catalyst around
which resentments, ambitions, 'hopes, and ideas could fuse
into a ccmmcn, if varied, body of opinion on the future of
the country." r 30]
b. World War II
"Possibly the greatest effect of Nigeria's
particioaticn in World War II was the sudden realization by
a large number cf ordinary Nigerians (as distinct from the
educated €lite) that there were Europeans who were different
from the privileged colonial administration. Europeans who
were farmers and private soldiers, traders and shopkeepers,
bootblacks and servants like the Nigerians themselves." [31]
Again, as in the first world war, Nigerians began to think
of themselves as a nation equal to that of the Europeans. As
the differences in perceptions narrowed, the force of
Nigerian nationalism began to slowly move towards an uncer-
tain goal of self-determination in a loosely confederated
political entity which was beccming the Nigerian nation.
c. The Richards Const i-.ution of 1945
The year that World War II ended was also a
pivotal year for Nigeria's future-A new constitution was
published. The constitutional proposals of Sir Arthur
Richards in March 1SU5, marked the real turning point in
Nigeria's progress towards independence. "The constitution,





1. To promote the unity of Nigeria.
2. Tc provide adaquately within that unity for the
diverse elements which make up the country.
3. Tc secure greater participation by Africans in the
discussion of their own affairs." [32]
The most important feature of the new constitution was th«
inclusion of the north in the central legislature, a move
which furthered the unity of the country. However, simulta-
neously, regional councils were created for the North, East,
and West. Though they were mainly confined to discussion,
their creation has been severely criticized as being the
foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics. Richards
argued that, "the inclusion of the North, so long separated
from participation in national politics, necessitated seme
degreee cf regicnalization to allow for its very obvious
differences form the South." [33] However, before the
Richards Constitution, the keynote m Nigerian politics was
unification towards a centralized state (somewhat misdi-
rected under Lugard's amalgamation plan) and the realization
cf a ccmmcn nationality. But, with the new constitiut ion
this process seemed to be halted.
In the suimer of 1945 the resentment provoked by
the Richards Constitution was compounded by economic discon-
tent. Ycung Nigerians became disgruntled over two gross
economic ineguities. One, almost every high ranking job was
reserved for Europeans. Two, there was a wide disparity in
salary between Africans and Europeans doing the same job.
These zvc oroblems prompted a general strike by the Nigerian
Trade Unicn Congress, which paralyzed the vital services of
the country. The ultimate decision, by British authorities,
to grant Nigerian workers a cost cf living increase was
considered a meaningful success by the Nigerian unions.
Spurred on by the apparant success of the strike
and united under a single leader. Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, the
29

period between 1945-1947 presents a high water mark in early
Niqerian efforts for self-derermination. Howevar, Azikwe's
inability to consolidate his successes lead to his ultimate
failure es a possible candidate to lead Nigeria into
independence. [34]
By 1948, The degree of unity attained under
Azikwe and the trade union movement disappeared, with dele-
gates from different ethnic groups exhibiting personal
titterness towards each other. "Nigeria, like the rest of
west Africa, was suffering from postwar shortages and wide-
spread unemployment, with the streets of Lagos filled with
men seeking work. An element of revolt was visible." [35] In
Nigeria the pressures seemed to exacerbate inter communal
conflicts, diluting the small degree of national unity that
had been achieved.
There was one last effort to build a unified
movement. "In November, 19 49, a strike among coal miners at
Enuqu led tc violence. The police ware accussed of shooting
twenty-one miners." [36] The news of this massacre set off
chain reactions in several cthsr cities. A National
Emergency Committee was formed to represent the case of the
miners before a commission of inquiry. It was hoped that
this Ccmmittee would hold together to present a united front
in the campaign for self-government. However, The committee
dissolved scon after presenting its case and Nigeria
returned to communal politics.
d. The Macpherson Constitution of 1952
By late 1949 Richards had been replaced as
governor by the more liberally minded. Sir John Macpherson.
Macuherscn realized that he was responsible for a society
that was perched on a political pcwderkeg. "He quickly mads
it clear that he was prepared tc revise the Richards
Constitution, consult with African opinion, introduce
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Africans into the higher civil service, and improve the
facilities for higher education." [37]
Many Nigerians in the political world were
convinced that Britain seriously intended to offer eventual
self-government. It seemed to many that those who desired
the end cf colonial government were pushing an open door:
"the real issue was what character self-government was to
take and what was tc be the timetable for independer.ee."
[38 ]
"What seeis certain is that the offer of a new
constitution and the wide ranging discussions over its
nature were used by the Nigerians to seek communal and
regional advantage rather than to envision th 9 creation of a
single nation state and forga the means of building it."
[39 ] The whole debate on the new constitution was based on
the issue of what form of regional federation should be
recommended, with no discussion as to the divisive nature of
communal politics. Ihe constitutional conferences held in
each of the three regions all proposed a federal system
based on the existing regions. Each region was to be given a
certain executive and legislative authority with an increase
in the elected members to each political body. Differences
surfaced between the two southern regions and the north
concerning the extent of power to be left in colonial hands.
The south wished to attain majority control of the execu-
tives whil€ the north wanted tc retain their British commis-
sioners as the executive authorities. The consequences of
isolating the north from modernizing trends were beginning
to shew.
The dangers in the federated regional system
were r€cagni2ed by many younger Nigsrians, 7ari 'is groups of
young Nigerians submitted resolutions suggesting alterna-
tives to the general conference. A particularly percsptive
resolution came from the Nigeria Society, formed by students
31

in London. [40] Tho students proposed that the various
ethnic qrcups should be given control over their domestic
affairs without orejudice to the government of the country
as a whole. "They suggested that Nigeria be divided into nine
administrative units, so that none of them would be large
enough tc threaten the authority of the central government,
and that loyalty to Nigeria must transcend all local attach-
ments and sectarian alignments." [ <* 1 ] These young Nigerians
were able to percieve the dangers that their elders refused
to recognize as being more vixal rhan their own immediate
interests.
These warnings went virtually unheeded. A
constitution emerged that provided a form of parliamentary
government in each of the three regions and at the canter.
The division of powers between the center and the regions
was somewhat vaguely defined, but the regions cculd make
laws governing local social services, courts, taxation,
agriculture, educaticn, and various local economic matters,
subject to the qoveiicr's final authority. Ho wever , it was
the political implications rather than the details of the
new constitution that were of major significance. What had
not been anticipated was that political parties would be
formed tc ccntest the proposed elections.
There arcse a dominant political party in each
region. The NC NC concentrated en the east. In the west
Awolcwo founded the Acticn Group. In the North the tradi-
tionally based Northern's People Congress (NPC) was formed
fcy Balewa. Later, Aminu Kano, led a breakaway party in the
north, the Northern Elements Progressive Onion (NSPU) . The
success cf KanoVs party caused the more traditional NPC tc
reorganize. Ahmadu 3€llo,th9 Sardauna of Sokoto, became the
dominant fiaure supported by the emirs,
"The first elections under the new constitution
made it evident that, unless some massive groundswell caused
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a revolt against the domina rt trend, the future of Nigeria
would be characterized by a balancing of interests and
strengths between tte three regional parties, by rivalry
between north and south, and by conflict between majority
and mincrity ethnic groups within each region. Those
Nigerians in a position to influence the course of their
country's history appeared to have accepted the underlying
implications of the Lugard. doctrine: "The major ethnic commu-
nities were to regard themselves as separate political enti-
ties. How could they simultaneously create a Nigerian nation
state, or avoid provoking a constant clash of interests
within tte Nigerian framework, were questions that they
seemed to avoid as sedulously as Lugard and the Colonial
Office had avoided tkem in the past." [42]
The Macpherson constitution (which came into
effect in 1952) though much more liberal than its pred-
ecessor, and mere in keeping with Nigerian desires, was
short lived. This ephemera 1 existence was created, in part,
for two reasons. One, because of its own deficiencies. Two,
because of the colitical situation at the time. From the
party point of view there was a fundamental difference
between those elements which wanted a constitution that
would give greater powers to the central government, and
•chose that wanted to retain as much power as possible in the
regions.
In effect, the Macpherson constitution was a
ccmDrcmise between the two positions, effectively appointing
power neither to the center nor the regions. Addi"^ ionally,
since its incaotion, it was touted as only a step towards
further constitutional development, therefore, the various
parties always seemed to have an eye on future change.
Throughout the life of the constitution polit-
ical manuevering continually threatened to bring about its
demise. Tensions between the north and the two southern
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regions came to a head over who would control the
govarnment. In time, the East managed to establish a
minority coalition which was intolerable to the northern
parties. The final breakdown came in 1952. The West proposed
a bill demanding self government by 1956, the North was
unabl€ tc support this motion as they felt they were as yet
unready for self government. By failing to support the bill,
the northern ministers, in conjunction with the European
ministers, were able to stave off this early attempt at
gaining Nigerian self government. In return, the north
proDosed a milder bill calling for self government as scon
as practicable. Bitter resentment resulted between tha North
and Sourh as a result of the North's reluctance to move
toward indei:en dence. "The situation was particulary tense in
Kano b€caus€ of the large Southern minority in tha Sabon
Gari , or strangers quarter, and from 15-19 May 1956 there
were sericus communal riots with an official death toll of
36 killed and 24 1 wounded, -chough it is almost certain that
the numbers were much larger." [43] Tribal and regional
separatisi came to a violent head during this time and there
was much concern that Nigeria wculd be split in two. The
long separation of the north and tha south appeared to have
left too great a gap for their recant political collusion to
overcome. Tha immediate result of the riots was that the
Nigerian constitution would be radrawn "to provide for
greater regional autonomy and for removal of powers of
intervention by the center in matters which could, without
detriment to other regions, be placed entirely within
regional competence." [4U]
e. The Constitution of 1954
All of Nigeria's parties sent delegations tc the
new constitutional conference in London. There were many
misgivings aaong the delegates which made success seem
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almost impossible. The North wanted all powers delegated to
the region with the exception of defense, customs, and ?. few
others. The southern regions called for self government by
1956, an issue which was still being blocked by the adamant
refusal of the north.
Against this unpromising atmosphare it is
incredible how much agreement was reached by the delegates
to the Lcndcn conference. The thras major parties (Action
Group, NCNC, and NFC) agreed to a federal constitution in
which residual powers would be transferred to the regions
instead of the center, as had been the case under the old
constitution. All the same, the center was given much wider
powers than had been envisaged by the Nori-h. The quesxicn of
self gcv€rnment by 1S56 was avoided by offering self govern-
ment to the regions that wished ±z by then but not to the
entire federation. This manuever left the North free to
embark on self government whenever it felt secure enough to
do so. This plan fcr self government represented a great
concession by the British government which had previously
stated; that self government could only be achieved when all
of the regions felt they were ready at the same time. It
seems rsasonailbe that the British wished to avoid another
riot, similar to that which occurred in Kano in 1956, by
granting this concession. Additionally, this marked the
first time the British had consented to a fixed date for
self government.
The conference appeared as a great success. From
a pessimistic beginning the rules for -he actual functioning
of the federation were settled by tha delegates. "Nigeria
became a full federation of three regions, a federal capital
(Lagos) , and the territory of tha Southern Cameroons (a
breakaway territory from eastern Nigeria). A national legis-
lature cf 184 members, half from the north, was to be
elected every five years. Elections were to take place at
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reqicnal level under a system which varied from region to
region." r^5] The tendency towards the creation of three
Nigerias was consolidated by the regionalization of the
civil service and the judiciary. Most notably, in 1956, the
Moslem Court of Appeal (an in£titu*:ion without precedence in
the Islamic world) was set up to act as a bridge between the
native Shari'a courts administering Islamic law and the High
Courts.
Finally, the 1954 constitution transferred resi-
dual powers to the regions. At the close of the conference
it was crcfflised that the constitution would be reviewed in
August 1956, however, despite some subseguent changes, it
became the constitution which laid down the basic pattern of
government which was to take Nigeria through independence
and beyond.
"The 1954 constitution marked -he end of the nation-
alist struqqle with Britain; for the next six years, until
the achievement of independence on 1 October 1960, Nigerian
leaders were preoccupied not so much with wresting power
from the colonial government as dealing with the day-to-day
administration and development of the their country as well
as settling the basis on which they would co-operate with
each other." [46] It was, therefore, not surprising that the
year after the new constitution came into effect was a guiet
one, while ministers and other civil servants began learning
the mechanics of their new jobs.
While the Nigerian leaders were engrossed in the
intricacies of learning their new governmental structure
thev were also able to keep an eye on the constitutional
review scheduled for 1956. At that time it was assumed that
both the East and the West would cash in on the British
promise of self government by 1956. Due to some political
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par-cy rivalries the actual conference tooJc~~pl ace in 1957. it
was primarily concerned with constritutional revision in
light of recent past experiences and in accordance with
predicted constitutional advance. At the conference it was
agreed -hat both the East and the West should have self
government as soon as they wanted it.
It almost seemed that Nigeria was ready for indepen-
dence in 1957. However, the North still refused to be
rushed into self government maintaining their position that
the Northern leadership was as yet unprepared to assume
resDonsitility for the region's administration. The North
was still suffering from the isolation imposed by the policy
of indirect rule. With a large population and only a handful
cf university graduates, the North feared that its adminis-
tration would be controlled by southern expatriates.
Additionally, there still remained an uncertain relationship
between the autocratic emirs and the new system of democ-
racy. The Sardauna cf Sokoto did not wish to inflame this
relationship by Dressing for self government. Therefore, it
appeared in 1957, as though the Northern region would hold
UD the process of independence for the entire country
through its reluctance to accept self government. Lugard's
isolationists oolicies had finally come home to roost, or so
it seemed. However, the Sardauna of Sokoto announced that
the North would become self gcverning in 1959 causing
considerable relief among the other delegates in 1957.
The most complex problem facing the 1957 delegation
was the issue of minority groups. Since the inception of the
Macoherson constitution these groups had been working to
avoid cclitical domination by the major regional ethnic
groups. The efforts of the minorities to assuage this domi-
nation centered on their proposal to create new states which
would enhance eguality in the political process. A
Minorities Commission was established and charaed with
37

making a recommendation on this difficult problem. The
Commission reported that it was unnecessary to establish new
states since solutions could best be found in the existing
governmental structure. In 1958 the Second Confarence
accepted the Minorities report. "The agreement over the
Minoriti€s reoort was influenced by the fact that none of
the parties cared to stand out on the issue for fear of
being branded as the cne that held up independence." f'i'7] it
might seem that the Commission dodged the issue (especially
since it was widely known that the British government would
consider the creation of new states as a factor in delaying
independence). The Commission's thinking centered on the
idea that none of the three major parties would be able to
dominate the other and tha~ any party seeking domination
woudl have to go outside its regional stronghold and seek
supoort among the minority groups of the other regions. As
it turned cut the elections of 1959 showed just how dominant
a factor the minorities remained in the Nigerian poltical
arena. The elections showed that no party was strong enough
to form a government by itself. Tha minorities had precluded
regional domination of the Nigerian elections and forced a
coallticn government.
The 1959 elections repeated a fa^iiliar pattern. The
North dciinated the Federal House and rhe NPC dominated the
Senate. No party gained sufficient numbers to form its own
.government and after some intense bargaining the NPC and the
NCNC resumed their coalition. Balewa was reappointed as the
prime minister.
"The new legislature duly requestsd independence
from tha British government; the parliament at Westminister
thereupon Dassed an independence act on the basis of the
constitution that Nigerians themselves had approved. In
October 1960, Nigeria became an independent state and




The era of British rule had lasted less than a
century and direct cclonial rule over the country had lasted
just sixty years. During that- time nothing had been funda-
mentally altered, except that the pluralistic society of a
large country had become a single political unit. The socie-
ties within this country had remained essentially unaltered.
The actual event of independence was less than momentous
serving only to pass the major issues of the country
directly to the Nigerians themselves. The central issues of
ethno regional politics in a highly pluaralisric society
remained the same befcre and after October 1960.
E. COHFIICT iHD CHAHGE IN POST-IHDEPBNDENCE NIGERIA
"Nigeria, at independence, presented the classic picture
of the ex-colonial state whose constitutional forms were
designed to ^tisfy the terms of colonial withdrawal rather
than cope effectively with the realities of its own polit-
ical conditions." rU9^
Prior to Independence, Nigeria's leaders accepted the
premise that British forms of government were suited to
Nigeria's needs. Simultaneously, the construction of the
Nigerian federal system had been devised by the British
Colonial Administration wholly for purposes cf effective
British control. "Structural contradictions abounded: Most
notably the anomally that the northern segment was larger
than all the others put together yet was also the poorest,
educationally most disadvantaged, and least prepared cultur-
ally to engage in the games of modern democratic politics.
This situation was a legacy to the postindependence era."
[50)
The guestion of constitutional change became an imme-
diate controversy in postindependence politics. Within a
short time each major party had repudiated one or more of
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the central provisions in the existing constitution. Thes-?
actions combined with the realities of the plural nature of
Nigeria's social makeup promoted increasingly destructive
forces of regional political rivalry. The salient features
of this kitter regioralism, and the dynamics of the unres-
trained party competition within the Nigerian federation
were:
1. Regional power: The original pattern of Nigerian
political regionalism reflected a genuine diversity
of geoDolitical and cultural sections. In the north
the majority Hausa-Fulani sustained Islam influenced
social institutions, including political structures
that were hierarchical, authority centered, bureau-
cratic, and ascriptive. Their degree of assimilation
within the cclcnial structure was highly limited,
primarily due to the policy of Indirect ral9.
In the west the Yoruba were roughly divided between
Muslims and Christians, and were politically devoted to the
principles of a limited monarchy. Their penetration by colo-
nial authority was early and intense.
In contrast to toth groups, the Ibo in the east,
rejected centralized authority in favor of a network of
segmented units that endorsed egalitarian principles and
aggressive individual initiative. Their attitude toward
western influenced change was percieved as aggressively
opportunistic.
Additionally, a great number of minority ethnic groups,
with varyinc features of social and political organization,
coraorised roughly half the total Nigerian population. Their
cultures were often besieged and assimilated by the major
ethnic qroucs.
From the outset of their incorporation in"^o the Nigerian
federation each of these ma jority and minority peoples expe-
rienced acute apprehension of political domination by
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another. The hallmark of all these groups was isolaticnism
rather than expansiorism, combined with mutual accussations
that each desired to dominant the whole. The essential paro-
chialism cf this era was abetted by distribution of consti-
tutional powers that placed the regional units of the
oriainal federation in a decisive position. As a result of
the 1959 elections and the promotion of regional hegemonic
ambitions it became impossible for any real difference to
exist between perceptions of regional power and calculations
of national dominance.
2. Party com:)etition and party structure: "Another way
^0 focus on what had gone wrong in Nigeria was to
discover why political party competition had failed
to have the beneficial effects expected of it. In
theory (and in terms of lessons learned within the
western experience) conditions of social pluralism
are expected *c stimulate political parties to act as
agents of an integrative process involving brokering,
bargaining, ccipromise, problem solving, negotiation,
coalesencs, and like activities indicative of the
problem solving process." [51]
The notion that the combination of social pluralism and
democratic competition automatically produces politically
stabilizing results seems unlikely in the Nigerian case. The
problem that evolved was; political competition rapidly
deteriorated into political enmity.
Perhaos the most significant example of this contra-
diction between competition and enmity lias in the challenge
of cross regional penetration of one party into the
geocraphical and cultural area of another. The logic of the
ccmoetition dictated that the a*-tempt be made in order to
gain a wider oolitcal base. However, success exacerbated
fears net so much of winner-take- all but of
loser-f cr feit-all resulting in exclusion from the national
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scene. Failure to peEStrate other regions generated frustra-
tion at the parties inability to improve its position. The
more the system provoked these- negative experiences, the
more anqer and disillusionment was directed toward the
constitutional settlement which had designed the situation.
The more the constitution lost acceptance, the more virulent
were cross party perceptions. Wirhin the old constitutional
framework only more effective mobilization of ethnic power
offered any hope of change.
1 • The Conflict Begins
By 1964, Nigeria was facing a major political
crisis. The extremes of regional politics, a rapidly
expanding economy, and a widening social stratification
contributed to a political and social environment which can
only be described as chaotic. The elections in that year
became the death knell for Nigerias democratic republic.
Called a farce by many, the 1964 elections again
resulted in a coalition government which excluded the Action
Group. The actual events of the election exceed the scope of
this paper, however, at their conclusion there were many in
Nigeria who were disgusted with the conduct of federal poli-
tics and who believed that they could manage affairs better
within -heir own communities.
In 1965, a fellow on election in the west, marked the
final phase in Nigerias postindependence political institu-
tions. Again, the details are nor as important as the
outcome. The personalities involved, while significant,
succcmt to the tracedy of events which surrounded this
regional election. Arrests, riots, and shootings acccmpanied
this farcical atteupt at democracy. A chaotic outcome
evolved whereby the contending parties both claimed the
right tc form a government. The leader who emerged,
Akintola, was suspected of allying with the central

governit€n+; to prevent a coalition government of the Action
Group and the NCNC form winning the west. This chaotic
pattern cf government was to be shortlived as other forces
were at work to take control of Nigerias government. The
1965 election was tragically significant for the future. It
is estimated that apprcxima tely 2,000 people were killed and
many of those were northern Hausa. The repercussions of
these actions were to bear heavily on the future of
Nigeria's gcvernment.
a. The First Coup
The first Nigerian republic was on its deathbed
ty 1966. There had been hints of military intervention but
these rumors were discounted by Prime Minister Balewa and
others tas€d on tie assurances of the special police.
However, during the night following a conference between
Akintcla and Bello to halt the Action Group-NCNC coalition a
couc was executed. Ey the next day Akin-ola, Balewa, and
Eellc were dead as well as the chief finance minister, who
had been a decandent symbol of ostentatious living in
Nigerian gcvernment. [52] A number of northern army officers
were also killed but neither southern premier was harmed in
Eenin nor Enugu. General Ircnsi, the military commander was
trying to gain control cf the army during this time, and did
prevent it from occupying Lagos.
In the capital there was chaos. President Azikwe
was in London and no one knew for sure the fate of Balewa.
Questions arose as to whether or not to appoint another
Prime Minister and whether or not he should be from the
north or south. Eventually, General Ircnsi, an Ito, assumed
power and he formed a military government stressing the
teffl':orary nature of his actions while promising to seek a
new constitution and stamp out corruption and dishonesty.
The country seemed relieved to be free of the pclitical
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circus which had marred Nigerian political life. Everycne
was content to await developments under the new revolu-
tionary government.
It did net take Icng to realize that Ironsi was
essentially a soldier and not a politician. He made numerous
mistakes and tended to think mainly as an Ibo. His honeymoon
period was shortlived. Northerners became suspicious of his
plan to atolish the regions and make them provinces under a
central authority in a type of unification scheme. The north
feared Ito domination and they recalled that it was mainly
northerners who had been killed in the coup which had been
led by Ibc officers. Ironsi tried to initiate reforms but
was unsuccessful. The idea that the coup was a plot to
impose Iho (southern) domination over the country gained
ground. Ibo's began boasting of killing the Sardauna (Bello)
and resentment in the north gained momentum.
In May, 1966, Ironsi published his Unification
Decree. Northern resentment exploded into violence as-ricts
again swept the sabcn gari outsida of Kano. Northerners
swept through the predominantly Ibo settlement killing and
turning. I- seemed as if their day of revenge had come and
as the violence spread there was also talk cf open
secession.
b. The Second Coup
By Hay it was clear that the first coup had
solved little. Further coups seemed to be widely expected
although there was seme conjecture a s to whether they would
come from the north or the south. In July, 1965, while he
was stayinq in Ibadan, Ircnsi was siezed by northern
soldiers and shot. Again the army was torn by ethnic loyal-
ties as easterners were killed by northern mutineers.
General Gcwcn, the army chief of staff, was sent to nego-
tiate with the mutineers and within a short time he had
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emerged as the new supreme commander and immediately
repealed the Unification Decree, which had been Ironsi's
downfall.
Gowon was, himself, an oddity for although he
was a northerner he was also a Christian. Educated at
Sandhurst in England, he was a sincere, shy, modest man who
became the only symbcl of national unity in Nigeria. •
Gowon's first, step was to quell the factional
infighting within the army. He did this by posting soldiers
to garrisons in their own regions. This solution worked
fairly well in the short run but it tended to exacerbate two
problems. One, there were very few Yoruba in the array,
consequently, Gowon had to station northern troops in the
west, a manuever which appeared to western leaders like an
army of occupation. Two, by splitting the army Gowon
fostered the growth of regionalism and, in particular, gave
the eastern regicn its own defensive capability,
additionally, most of the best officers were Ibo's and by
splittinc the army alcng ethnic lines Gowon tended to srrip
the rest of his army of competent leadership; a problem
which was to surface dramatically during the conducx of the
civil war.
Gowon* s next step was constitutional review as
he was genuinely anxious to return Nigeria to civilian rule
as seen as possible. A conference was called comprised of
regional leaders. The content of the conference seems some-
what insignificant for this paper. The north which had orig-
inally voted for a loose association with the right of
regions to secede changed its tune and began to demand a
strong central government, probably as a result of pressure
from minority groups which did not want to return to a
regional system dominated by the major ethnic factions.
However, these debates were violently interrupted as a




Resentment against Ibo economic, educational,
and technical supericrity had been simmering in th» north
for years. It became a case where an alien minority began to
economically dominate a larger community. On this occasion
the fury of the northerners was aroused by reports -that
northerners had been killed in the east. "On what is now
referred tc in Nigeria as "Black Thursday," September 29,
1966, mob violence broke out against, the tens of thousands
of Ibcs who until ther had been shopkeepers, civil servants,
and service workers throughout the north. Estimates of the
number of deaths ranee from 5,000 to 50,000, and the number
of Ito3 who subsequently returned home as refugees from
around the federation may have ranged from 700,000 to
2,000,000. There were reprisals against Northerners living
in the cast, although there had been relatively few
Hausa-Fulani in the region." [53]
The events in the north and east mads fur+her
constitutional discussions academic. General Ojukwu, the
military governor of the eastern region, faced the monu-
mental task of caring for -^.he flood of refugees streaming
into the eastern region. Ojukwu refused to meet further in
Lagos unless his personal security could be assured.
Furthermore, Ojukvu found nc reason to recognize Gowcn's
authority and he was being pressed by high ranking civil
servants to seek secession. It seems -hat, "the massacres in
the north and the return cf refugees, however atrocious,
also benefitted Ojukwu's military regime in the east. The
immedia-^e effect was to traumatize much of the population
and, as Oiukwu later recalled, the shock enabled him to





Conditions deteriorated steadily after the violsnce
in the north and in January, 1967, after several abort-iva
attempts Nigerians military leaders met in Ghana to try and
avoid whar appeared to be an inevitable rush towards the
dissolution of Nigeria. ju kwu dominated zhis conference and
refused to accept any proposals which would allow the
federal governmant to interfere in regional affairs.
Significantly, in March, 1967, Ojukwu appropriated all
federal revenues collected in his rsgion. This action placed
all of Nigeria on the verge of disintegration and in a final
effort tc save the federation from total collapse the north,
which violently opposed the creation of new states, agreed
tc allow an increased number of states in their region. This
action brought the west into an agreement for a stronger
central government and led to the ast ablishment of sanctions
against the east. Despite several efforts by the central
government at reconciliation with Ojukwu, the east moved
relentlessly toward secession and on 26 may, 1967 Ojukwu
declared the eastern region a free and sovereign state here-
after tc be referred to as the Republic of Biafra. At the
same time he dissolved all ties with the Federal Republic of
Nigeria.
General Gowon immediately declared a state of emer-
gency and reimposed the blockade of the east.
Simultaneously, he announced that. Nigeria would be divided
into twelve states. However, Ojukwu persisted in his effort
to declare the eastern region a free and sovereign state and
war he-^ween the east and the rest of Nigeria became
inevitable.
The conduct cf the civil war was significant both
for Nigeria and the nations in sub-Sahara Africa with a
vested interest in discouraging secessionist movements. The
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intricacies, international ramifications, and conduct of the
civil war have been well • documented in other works [55] and
are beyond the purview of this paper. Most significantly,
the war began on July, 1967 and ended on 12 January, 1970
and resulted in the complete disruption of Nigerian politics
and eccncmy. The eastern region was beset by starvation,
disease, and poverty and all o-f Nigeria was suffering from
the enmity rrecicitated by the onslaught of what some have
called -he Brothers War. The civil war marked the culmina-
tion of a series cf policies beginning with Lugard's
Indirect Bule, that perpetrated the rise of et hncregional
political entities and fostered the emergence of a divided,
regionally based, political structure that enhanced the
plurali-y which clagued -he course of Nigerian unity.
C. POST CIVIL WAR POLITICS
The crotlems of the Gowcn regime, once it had gotten
beyond successful completion of the civil war, took somewhat
longer tc unfold but were just as rooted in the dilemma of
entrenched structure, change and legitimacy. Gcwcn's cwn
selection as head of state had been the result of negotia-
tions among factions of tha military that were, in part,
ethnicallv concieved. In terms of military norms his eleva-
tion was irregular as he was a junior officer. Furthermore,
the ccnvcluted circumstances cf the military rise to power'
had made for a certain ambivalence in defining the role of
his gcverrment. As a result, there was on one hand, the
stamp of a caretaker mission reflecting a promise tc restore
Nigerian democracy at an early date. On the ether hand,
there was the more strictly praetorian projection of being a
corrective regime dedicated tc structural reforms beyond the
capacity of civilian politicians. In these terras, the
performance cf the Gcwon regime may have been doomad from
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the start. It was neither convincingly corrective, as it
proceeded to temporize on virtually every, major area of
reform, nor plausable, as the announced deadlines for the
return to civilian rule came and went.
Among the measures temporized ware the census of 1973,
which was eventually rejected, the persistent issue for the
creation of more states(Gowon favored a twelve s-ate
Federation) , demobilization of the army, revenue realloca-
tion, and action against a host of administrative abuses.
Out of a nine point plan of reconstruction following the
civil war at least six were cancelled. Eventually, both
military and civilian leaders saw these failures as
intrinsic to the regime.
The rcor of the difficulties lay in the regime's uncer-
tain relationshio to the sources of Nigerian social power.
It: lacked the political traction to take charge. Probably
more important, was that Gcwon (an essentially compromise
military choice as head of state) felt unable to extend his
own implicit mandate to uphold and balance rather than to
govern the interests of various ethnic communities. The
revelation of the regime's true character was the perform-
ance of the state's governors, who came to rival in corrup-
tion and arrogance the most negative image of the old
regional style of civilian politics. Although that style
seems to have been alien to Gowon himself.
''
• Z^§ New Nijerjan Constitutional System
After the ouster of General Gowon in 1975, the mili-
tary regimes of Mohammed and Obasanjo adopted a staged
program for the return to civil governiient by October 1979.
The framework was to be the newly drafted constitution,
which had been approved by a Constituent Assembly composed
predominantly of members elected by local authorities, many
of whom had been prominent in civilian politics of the
U9

1960s. The assembly tased its deliberations or. the work of a
constitutional drafting committee whose results were
published as a draft for public review in October 1976.
Although the Federal Military Government (FMG) did
not participate in the preparations, it did instruct the
drafting committee to base its efforts on a federal struc-
ture that emphasized national unity rather than regional
interests. The committee was asked to devise an executive
system headed by a president, popularly elected, rather than
chosen by parliament. To minimize sectoral antagonisms that
had led to the downfall of the first civilian government,
the drafting committee was charged with producing a plan
that would ensure the organization of political parties on a
national basis and a cabinet reflecting the federal char-
acter of the government. The broad outlines of the draft
constitution were preserved intact daring debates by the
Constituent Assembly.
The Suoreme Military Council (SMC) , established by
General Mchammed and carried en by General Obasanjc, intro-
duced a moderate number of changes after the Constituent
Assembly comtDleted its work. Both the assembly and the SMC
stiffened the provisions dealing with corruption and outside
business interests by public officials. The SMC called for a
number of existing previsions of law to be raised to consti-
tutional status and thus be less vulnerable to modification
or revocation.
By any reckoning, this period must be considerad a
dramatic cccurance in Nigerian political history as it
permitt-^d the assumption of new political directions in
Nigeria. What can also be said is that the essence of the
new political framework, in contrast to the old, is the
decisive conviction that a deeply consultative process of
political reconstruction offered the hope not so much of
restoring legitimacy to national institutions as of creating
it for the first time.
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The new framework of democracy that was put in
motion was not, primarily, the product of pressures to
emulate Western experiences. On the contrary, the greatest
siqnificnace of both the new constitution and of certain
crucial supplementary administrative measures that together
are the foundation cf the new framework is that their
primary point of historic reference is Nigerian experi-
ence. (See App A-structure of Government).
The crux of this departure is a machine of represen-
tation that is deliberately designed to break the destruc-
tive association between competitive party politics and
disintegrative tendencies. These include the introduction of
an executive presidency that must be won through electoral
rules which stipulate that the winning candidate must
recieve not only the highest singla number of votes but also
25 oercent of the votes cast in two-thirds of the nineteen
Nigerian states. Failing that, he must be selected by an
electoral colleae involving all the national and state
representative legislative . bodies. The provision was
intended to make becoming president of Nigeria impossible
without a preoonderence of inter-regional support. Equally
central to this structure was the administrative creation of
nineteen states whose boundaries cut across the geographical
and cultural redoubts of the majority ethnic nations.
The area of innovation that occassioned the boldest
strokes was that of the constitutional regulation cf polit-
ical parties. Provisions extend so far as to prescribe a
minimum ethnic mix in the internal party structure.
Furthermore, the main source of party campaign finances is
the government, which empowers a strong Electoral Ccmmision
to set limits on expenditures as well as on conduct.
Membership in all parties must bs open to all Nigerians
irrespective of place of origin or religion.
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2 . The 1979 Elections 2 1 New Be gin inning
Eclitical life returned to Nigeria when five polling
days were set aside in July and Augusr 1979 for elections to
the federal and state assemblies, state governor ships, and
finally for direct national balloting for the president and
vice pr3sident. All Nigerians over eighteen were guaranteed
voting rights by the Constitution, including women of the
former Northern region previously denied . Rules were
imposed by the outgoing military government to limit the
number of political parties to those that could demonstrate
a national following and to induce the five political
parties that were officially recognized to conduct their
campaigns on the basis of nationwide rather than sectional
appeals.
In preparing for the reestablishment of civilian
political life in Nigeria, a priority objective of the mili-
tary governors was to attenuate the ethnic and regional
rivalries that had led to violence and the breakdown of the
civilian government of 1960-1966. The redrawing of the
boundaries of the four regions into twelve and *:hen nineteen
states, checlcinq the Hausa-Fulani domination of northern
politics, and enabling smaller ethnic groups to obtain a
share cf political power were essential steps in this
process. The military government rescinded the ban on polit-
ical parties in 1978 and empowered the independent FEDECO to
recieve aoplications for registration of parties. FEDECO was
reguired fcy the new Constitution to restrict recognition to
those parties having offices in at least two-thirds cf the
states, partv names devoid of ethnic, religious, or
geographic connotations, memberships open to all citizens,
and headguarters in the capital city of Lagos. Nineteen
parties applied, only five met the qualifications.
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Elaborate preparations preceded the most massive
election ever conducted in Africa. To accommodate over U7
ii'illicn registered voters, 97,000 polling stations were
readied and 400,000 election officers designated. The
turnout of voters was, however, disappointing, attaining its
peak cf 35 percent only in the presidential election. This
poor turnout prompted many candidates to declare the
election illegal and brought numerous charges of faulty or
inadaguate registration of voters.
Shagari of the NPN recieved 5,688,857 votes and was
elected as Nigeria's first executive president along with
his vic= presidential running mate, Alex Ekuwueme. Awolowc,
the candidate of the UPN, followed closely with 4,916,651
votes. The new constitution required that an electoral
college of the Senate, House, and stare assemblies select
the president from the two leading candidates unless one
candidate demonstrated more than sectional appeal by
securing 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of Nigeria's
nineteen states. Shagari did win more than 25 percent in
twelve sta-^es but only 19.9 in the thirteenth, Kano.
Although FEEECO had previously raled that thirteen states
constitut€d the mandated two-thirds majority, it declared
Shaaari the winner by finding that by gaining one-fourth of
two-thirds (one-sixth) in the thirteenth state, he had been
elected in the first round. FEDECO' s decision was regarded
as clumsy and clouded Shagari' s victory. It was confirmed,
however, ty a special tribunal whose findings were upheld by
the Supreme Court. In defense of -he finding it was noted
that Shacari proved to be the only candidate with more than
a regional following. Moreover, it was feared that if the
election were shifted to the national and state legisla-
tures, an opportunistic political deal could transfer
victory tc Awolowo, thereby thwarting the popular will and




Th€ NPN emerced as the most successful party ir. the
Senate and House of Bepresentatives elections, although it
did net secure a majority vote in either body. The rela-
tively broad appeal of the NPN was most apparan-i: in the
Bouse where it was able to elect two or more representatives
from sixteen of the nineteen states. In both houses
Awolowo's OPN showed the second greatest strength. Azikiwe's
NPP, which was third strongest in the Senate and House
contests, joined the NPN in a coalition that provided the
NPN-NPP a working majority in both houses. The PRP and the
GNPP trailed the three main parties at some distance.
In the state elections traditional regional and
ethnic voting patterns remained in evidence, notably in the
south where the OPN overwhelmed other parties in the Ycruba
dominated states of Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, -and Lagos and won
easily in Bendel State with its varied population. The NPP
wen decisively in the heavily Ibo states of Anambra and Imo
and the mors ethnically mixed Plateau State. The results of
the North reflected sectional loyalties to a lesser degree.
The NPN, regarded as the party of the Hausa-Fulani conserva-
tive establishment, did win with large majorities in the
more traditional states such as Niger, Bauchi, and Sckoto.
It was, however, decisively defeated in Kano State and lost
the governorship in Kaduna State while the GNPP took the
northeastern states cf Gongola and Borno, which have predom-
inant Kanuri populations. The socialist oriented PR? won
strongly in the copulcus, relatively industralized northern
state of Kano and also won the governorship of neighboring
Kaduna. Modernizing tendencies in the north linked to
economic growth, better education, and distaste for
continued emirate dcmination appeared to contribute to the
rifts in ths north.
Overall structural results of the 1979 elections are
imoortant. Several developments that appear to reflect
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mov-ement in the structural dynamics of party competition
towards a more balanced distribution of national power and
which are indicative of less parochial strategies include
the following:
1. The running nate of each presidential candidate was
from a cultural area, state, or region other than
that of the presidential con-cender.
2. No carty won all the elected posts wi'^hin its
cultural area, state, or region.
3. No party failed to win a significant number of votes
outside its cultural area, state, or region.
4. No party scored a majority or plurality nationally
merely by virtue of victory in its home cultural
area, state, or region.
5. The categories of "elected unopposed" declined
sharply as did failures to secure the reguired
mir.iffium number of votes.
6. Except for the PRP , all parties won at least 5
oercent of the votes of other regions.
7. The NPN wen 53.2 percent of its subpresidential votes
outsida its own region.
8. Each partv wen a significant number of subpresiden-
tial posts and no party was shutout.
9. Out of a tctal of 1,910 subprasidential elected
offices, no party recieved less than 10 percent or
iDcre than 36.5 percent of the total.
10. Each of the five parties won control of the governor-
ship in at least two states and of the State Assembly
in at least ore.
11. The Hausa-Pulani party (NPN) increased its share of
the old Eastern vote from to 33.6 percent and
increased its share of the vote in the i?est and Lagos
from to 2 percent and 22.1 percent , respectively.
It suffered a decline in the percentage of the
Northern vote, from 61 percent to 55.4 percent.
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12. The Ibo party (NPP) share of the old Eastern vote
declined from 64 percent to 6 0.7 percent, although
its share of the votes in other regions also
declined, and ttore sharply.
13. Only the Yoraba party (UPN) can be said to have
b€ccme, in these terms, more parochial since 1959.
The acid test of the Second Republic, as was true also of
the First, will be its capacity to sustain nonviolent trans-
fers of power and in the interim to allow effective exercise
of opposing powers at both state and local levels. The
inability of the First Republic to pass such tests inhered
partly in the tendency for all important political conflict
to be resolved into structural antagonisms, pursued under
the framework of pure constitutional permissiveness. The
innovative frameworic of the Second Republic has been traced
to a determination to counteract the worst results of these
arrangements. The guestion now arises whether in these terms
the framework of the Second Republic is actually making any
difference in the conduct of politics.
D. THE 80* S - COHTIBDITT OR CHANGE
Since Nigeria' s return to a democratic civilian govern-
ment many forces - pclitical, social, and economic - have
arisen tc threaten the fabric of Nigerians new inst itu-cicns
.
Nigeria's capacity to sustain non-violent transfers of power
and its capacity to jraintain a democratic form of government
have been olagued by an erratic, oil based economy, a desta-
tlized population as a result of increasing urban migration,
the continuance of ethnic frictions prevalent sines the
beginning of Britain's colonial governance, and most




In th€ iiext three chapters three forces, Islam,
ethnicity, and the econo-my, which will- influence the polit-
ical qrowth and development of Nigeria in the 80's will be
briefly analyzed. The intent of this analysis is to deter-
mine the likelihood that any of these three forces could




HI. IS LA HI C VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA-FOND AMEHTALISH IN THE SO^J
Whil€ Nigeria faces but a few threats from external
sources, it faces several grave threats from within.
Paramount among these internal thrsats may be the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism in northern Nigeria.
In iseo and again in 1982 northern Nigeria was rocked by
violent religious uprisings. These outbursts, attributed to
Islamic fundamentalist groups, raised some serious questions
for the Nigerian government. Both domestically and interna-
tionally there was ccrcern that these outbursts could be the
forerunner of a broader movement in the same vein as the
Iranian Revolution. Secondly, there arose, within Nigeria,
much speculation and apprehension about the origins of the
riots and the nature cf the participants. Finally, there was
concern that these events were the symptoms of a larger
socic-eccnomic crisis facing Nigeria.
A. TBE KAHO BIOT
On 18 December, 1S80 religious violence broke out ir the
city of Kane, Nigeria. A then obscure group known as the Yen
Izala Sect marched on the central mosque of Kano declaring a
Jihad against all Muslims who did not accept their teach-
ings. As -^he state police stepped in to stop the march,
violence erupted which ultimately resulted in the deaths of
ever U,000 ceople. Ihe enormity of so great a loss of life
and the destructiveness created by the ensuing violence
necessitates a greater understanding of the forces behind
the 198 riots.
Three motivations for the 1980 Kano riots, which I have
ccnviently labelled religious, political and international.
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provide a means for analysis cf the riots as well as the
current trend of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria.
The. first, and pcssibly most superficial mot ivation ,. was
religion. The existerce of fundamentalist groups in Nigeria
is not new. The prevalence of the Qadariyya and Tijaniyya
brotherhoods has contributed to an overall brand cf Islam in
Nigeria which is essentially uncompromising and historically
violent. The Yen Izala Sect, which is only one of a number
of fundamentalist groups at work in the northern porticr. of
Nigeria, seems to typify the more or less constant conflict
between the brotherhoods concerning the comparative purity
of their observance cf Islam. The sects stated aim is,- "to
stike a.z materialism and privilege and to purify Islamic
religicus pratice. Hcwever, it also claims to be against the
need to face Mecca at prayer, against such ostentation as
private houses and the possession of wrist watches." [56]
Led by Alhaji Huhammadu Marwa, also called the
Maitesine, the Yen Izala Sect had a colorful leader whose
past included deportation from Kano in 1962, a reappearance
in aaidurguri in 1976, and his subsequent relocation back in
Kano after the Borno State police destroyed the "hide-cuts"
of the sect in Maiduguri. Infused with an almost mystic
ferver the followers of the Maitesine believed themselves
invulnerable and rushed through the streets of Kano headless
of the fury of the violence which surrounded them.
On the surface a purely religious explanation for the
1980 riots is acceptable. All the ingredients; suppression,
history, and martyrdom are present. However, it s'^e^ps imper-
ative to try and discover seme othsr ao-civa-ion for an act
of violence so brutal that over 4,000 people, including the
Wairesine, were killed. After all, the same conditions have
been prevalent since the days of the 18th - 19th century
Jihads, when Othman dan Fodio initiated his holy wars to
purify Islam in west Africa. What catalyse, after nearly
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two centuries, ignited the reawakening of activity in
northern Niaeria.
One explanation may be politics. "Dr. Junaid S.
Muhammad, a member of the PEP and chief whip in the House of
Representatives at the time, reportedly stated that the Kano
riots were "a carefully concieved plan by the Mossad-The
Israeli Zionist Secret Service-and Chief Awolowo, the leader
of the UPN and a recent visitor, at that time, to Israel."
[57]
Additionally, the seriousness of the violence pointed
out several distinctive inadaquaciss in Nigerian security.
First, the Nigerian police force was found to be ill trained
and ill equipped and completely lacking in their ability to
handle the emergency. As a result of these inadaquacies the
Armv and the Air Fcrce had to ba called in to quell the
riots, which led to further assertions that members of the
armed services were defecting to the fanatics.
Secondly, th» Kano incident, clearly showed the laxity on
the part of the Nigerian intelligence system. As articles in
the Nigerian Tribune and the National Concord stated, "If a
handful cf religious fanatics could successfully take the
law into their hands and for such a period of time, what
prevents Colonel Qaddafi from launching an invasion against
Nigeria from Chad?" With the destabilizing influence of
Libya Iccming large in west Africa there was a growing
suscicion that the Kano incident represented just the tip of
a "Monstrous Icsberg" that wculd span all of the northern
states. These statements combined with the severity of the
riot provided lucrative political fodder for the detractors
of President Shaqari's infant government as well as contrib-
uting to a form of national paranoia concerning the aiiDS of
Libya and the possible connections between Qaddafi's insur-
gence into Chad and the simultaneous outbreak of violence in
northern Nigeria. This paranoia lei to much speculation
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concerning the international ramifications of tha Kane riots
and provided the third motivation by which to analyze the
disturbances.
The international motivation for the Kano riots emerges
from two events. First, and most superficial, there was an
attempt tc connect the riots with Muslim extremists from
Iran. This explanation has been discounted largely as a
result of having not found any evidence to support it. The
second event, which precipitated much more action and reac-
tion, vas a connection that was made between Libya's
involvement in Chad and the almost simultaneous outbreak of
violence in Kano.
Nigeria was faced with grave internal threats resulting
from uneven economic development, rapid modernization, and
extremes of ethno-regional tensions. "The Nigerian govern-
ment was not only aware of these sources of instability, it
was acutely sensitive to the potential linkages between
domestic discontent and external threats. The riots in Kano
provided the historical context for the seriousness with
which Lagos viewed the threat from Libya, a coun-^ry whose
wealth, power, ideclogy, and religion could be us?d tc
exploit Nigeria's numerous internal divisions." [53]
In reaction to the Libyan invasion of Chad and the
simultaneous outbreak of lilitant Islamic sects in Kano
Nigeria instituxed several policies: 1) The northern
borders were reinforced with federal troops. 2) The defense
budqet was significantly increased. 3) Libyan diplomats were
expelled from Lagos immediately following the Lityan-Chad
merger. U) President Shagari tried to meet with Qaddafi to
call for an immediate wi-tihdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad
but Qaddafi refused tc discuss the issue. 5) Nigeria backed
an OAU effort to establish a peace-keeping force in Chad
which would correspond to Libya's withdrawal.
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In coniunction with these overt reactions was the
growing ccncern ancmg many Nigerian leaders about tha large
number of aliens coining into Nigeria, particularly, from
Chad. A cursory analysis cf the participants in the Kano
riots lead to a conclusion that many of the riox<5rs were
aliens and not native Nigerians. Thereby, The stage was set,
albeit unknowningly , for the mass expulsions which occured
in Nigeria in January 1983.
B. TBE 1981 AHD 1982 RIOTS
Since 1S80 two other notable examples of Islamic related
violence have occured In Nigeria. In July, 1981, Largely as
a result of a letter from Governor Rimi of Borno to the Emir
of Kano, spontaneous rioting erupted in Kane. Essentially,
the riotirg was a reaction to what Muslims considered an
insult to their spiritual leader. Governor Rimi outlined
nine points in which he accused the Emir of showing disre-
spect on several occassions. When news of the letter became
public, state buildings were attacked and either damaged or
destroyed. Most notably. Dr. Bala Muhammad, the gcverncr*s
political advisor and Dr. Muhammad's son were killed.
The scooe of this incident was small by compariscn to
the 1980 disturbances, however, the implication was clear,
that at least in northern Nigeria, the state was not yet
strong encuqh to attack the Islamic religious hierarchy with
impunity. The Islaiic tradition proved stronger than the
infancy cf contemporary politics.
The third occurrance of religious violence took plac'= in
three northern cities during October 1982. It was a rekin-
dling cf the same fcrces which had fueled the 1980 Kano
riots- A manifestation of a society suffering from the same
pains of rapid modernization, erratic economic growth,




The violence began on 26 October, 1982 in Maidurguri.
Police had just "arrested sixteen members of a fund=imen-
talist Muslim sect alledged to have been preaching without a
license." [59] What ensued was three days of uncontrolled
violence. It was quickly ascertained that the sect was the
same one which had prompted the violent uprising in Kano in
December, 1980. However, the preachers who were arrested had
been claiming that the late Maitesine was the true prophet
and that Mchammed was only an Arab whose name was
insignificant.
The make-up of the sect appears ro be relegated to the
poor, jobless, unskilled rural immigrants many of whom are
refugees and aliens seeking their fortunes in the relatively
prosporus economic climate of Nigerian cities. In esssnce,
it appears that the sect has offered. an outlet for the
growing number of dissatisfied people, following an I sialic
model which advocated violence as the primary means of inst-
igating change.
The numbers are confusing, * however, best estiirates
placed the number of dead in Maiduguri at 350 sect members
and 15 police. Subsequent rioting in Kaduna occurred en 29
October, 1982 wh€n the police investigated reports that some
200 of th€ sects followers had flei to that town. The result
was another U7 d9ad. In all, one can estimate that over UOO
people died in five days of violent rioting.
As in 1980, the police proved inept at handling the
emergencies. However, the Army and Air Force were withheld
because cf concerns ever political tensions. Again Nigeria
had been victimized by religious violence spawned by a sect
that was heretical in nature and populated by foreigners,
the jobless, and the mult itudiness masses of dissatisfied
Nigerians.
Finally, on 30 October, 1982, the last of this most
recent series of riots took place. Muslim students in Kano
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wen-t en a ramoace, burning down churches and hotels. "At,
first sight, it appears that the riots in Kano were nearly
contemporaneous, but in no other way connected, with th€
Maiduguri and Kaduna disturbances. The rioters in Kano were
members of the Muslim Students' Society (MSS) which, with
its emphasis on doctinal orthodoxy could hardly be consid-
ered in any degree syapathetic to Maitesine's movement which
was decidely heretical." [60] The impetus for this distur-
bance was the placement of an Anglican church toe close tc a
Mosque. However, it was later learned that the Mosque was
built in 1960 while the church had been built in 1926. The
development in Kano was most disturbing "because it was not
only inter-religious (unlike the Maitesine type which had
been in-ra-religious) but it was the first time the tradi-
tional fanatics carried out their attacks righ-^ to thp
churches. " [61 ]
A summary of the 1982 riots yields five areas of poten-
tial concern. First, the governments pardon of almost 1,000
Maitesine followers on the anniversary of Nigerian
Independence (1 October, 1982) was believed by many, in
Nigeria, to have lead directly to the disturbances. This
further demonstrated the governments lack of understanding
concerning the scope and character of Islamic fundamentalist
groups in Nigeria. Government credibility was severely
damaged as a result of this action.
Secondly, the riots again provided fertil9 ground for
the exploitation of internal political troubles as many of
the same claims made in 1980 were re-stated in 1982. Most
notabl'i, Mossad and Awolow c were again implicated as insti-
gatiors and organizers of the riots.
Third, the 1982 riots took an even more anti-wes-ern
dsameanor, oarticularly in Kano, were western churches were
attacked for the first rime.
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Fourth, the Nigerian internal security apparatus was
aqain challenged, and again it came up short as it took four
days to guell the violence in Maiduguri. In was apparant
that the qovernments promise to bolster security within the
states had fallen far short when confronted with realixy.
Closely associated with this was the governments perplexity
when confronted by an entity which it felt had been
desrrcyed in 1980. Again, the intelligence gathering agen-
cies in Nigeria had not performed up to expectations.
Finally, the 1982 riots served to highlight the growing
problem created by jobless aliens. The climate of poverty
created by an influx of immigrants and a dwindling eccncmy
provided fertile grounds for the recruitmani. of dissatisfied
young men into volital anti -establishment organizations. It
was perhaps this concern, more than any other single force
or incident which led -co the aass expulsions of
January-February 1983.
In an article entitled, "Nigeria: Whose Mistake." [62]
The following reason was given as paramount for the mass
expulsions from Nigeria. "It seems that the expulsion direc-
tive was precipitated by a report by the National Security
Organization on last years (1982) religious riots. Up to
700,000 Chadians are liable to be affected by the order
Chadians have long been implicated in most incidents of
Islamic unrest in Nigeria in recen- years."
The nex- section will trace the rise of Islam in Nigeria
and provide a basis for the analysis of contemporary Islaiic
fundamentalism in that ccuntry.
C. TBS HISTORY OF ISIia IN NIGERIA
The history of Islam in Nigeria, prior to the 20th
century, is inextricably inrerwovsn into the fabric of West
African history. There will be no attempr, here, to create
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the definitive work on Islam in West Africa. [63] The
puroose of this caper wi-11 be to incapsulate, in some chro-
nological order, the spread of Islam in west Africa and its
corresponding emergence in Nigeria. By this historical
review it is hoped that the foundation will be laid for
viewing Islam as a force for change in Nigeria. This paper
will deal with specific aspects of the spread of Islam into
wes-c Africa (and Nigeria) and will, by no means, attempt to
document every phase of Islamic expansion. The historic
episodes chosen, I believe, will emphasize the role of Islam
as a medium for change in the west African experience.
1. a Pocket Gui^e to Islam
Islam, today, is both a rsligion and a total way of
life for greater than 750 million Muslims in over seventy
countries. It is the youngest of the world's great religions
(only fourteen centuries old) with its beginnings rooted in
the drama of Mohammad's pilgrimage (the Hegira) from Mecca
to Medina in 622 A. D'.
From its earliest days, Islam has had the power to
unify diverse elements of culture and society into a bond of
worldwide brotherhood. This success can be directly attrib-
uted to the implicitly 'simple' requirements of the
religion. Based on the Quran and containing only five
tenants or "Pillars of Faith," [64] Islam has combined a
basic practicality wi*:h a nction of equality [65] to make it
especially attractive to the peoples of sub-Sahara Africa.
By accectina Islam, Africans gave up little and were able to
maintain many elements of their traditional religion while,
also, aainin:^ educational opportunities and the ability to




Islam presents itself in three basic forms:
1. Sunni - Also known as orthodox Islam. It is based on
the hereditary sucession of the Caliphate from
Mohammad and the four right Caliphs and on Sharia
law. It encompasses, approximately, 85 percent of all
Muslims.
2. Shi'ite - k more militant, fundamental, branch of
Islam. It differs from Sunni Islam in that it traces
the Caliphate from Ali (the step son and true heir to
Mohammad) and the descendants of Ali. The concept of
the "Mahdi" [66] stems from Shi»ite Islam. This form
of Islam is fcund in only a few areas of the Muslim
world, including Iran.
3. Sufi - Somewhat of a blend between both Shi'ite and
Sunni Islam. It is a mystical form of Islam, highly
ceremonial, and heavily ritualized. Sufis ra gave rise
tc many sects and brotherhoods (including the
whirling dervishes of the sastern Sudan) and became
the nrost proninent fcrm of Islam in west Africa.
Sufism is often referred to as the most progressive
fcrm of Islam blinding, as it does, parts of the
other forms of Islam while adopting a ncdernist and
adaptat ionist path. In west Africa, Sufism has a
history as the most militant and reformist type of
Islam.
2. Islam in West Africa: iOth ^ l^th Century
The spread of Islam in west Africa is a story of
Dynastys. As early as the 10th cantury, Islam was being
carried across the Sahara by nomads (primarily Berbers and
Fulanis) and Arab traders. These Muslim traders had the
effect of unifving populations under a single religion, an
exuerience unique to west Africa.
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The dynastic groupings in west Africa were already
clearly defined prior to the incursion of Islam. Kingdoms
existed, which closely adhered to three elements character-
istic of state buildirg: [67]
1. There was a central authority, usually a king.
2. The loyalty of the people was, first, to the state,
then to the groups within the state.
3. There was a concept that rhe state existed within
certain territorial boundarias.
In west Africa, three major states began their existance
during this era. They were Ghana, Mali, and Kanera-Borno.
These maior states were surrounded by many smaller states,
[68 1 some of which gained importance in later centuries.
These kinqdcms all possessed some- common features. First,
each could be called an empire wirh large territorial hold-
ings and a population loyal to a central government. Second,
these empires dealt heavily in trans-Saharan trade. Geld
and ivory were the najor sources of revenue and, as trade
increased, west Africa became the major source of gold for
the Arabic world. Third, wesr African empires provided
slaves to the Arabs. However, as mora West Africans
converted to Islam the harder it became for Arabs to exploit
this aspect of trade since it is unlawful for Muslims to
enslave other Muslims. Initially, this prohibition against
Muslims enslaving one another may have been a significant
factor in west African Islamic conversions. Fourth, the
extent of these empires was larger than most European
empires of the time. They possessed large armies, they were
multi-ethnic, and they responded to a central authority.
Fifth, Islam became increasingly important in these empires
as Arab traders built mosques and acted as court recorders
for the various dynastys. West African merchants converted
to Islam to expand their economic opportunities by trading
with their Arab counterparts within the great Muslim
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trotherhcod. Finally, within these empires Islam grew into a
state religion and, for the first time, west Africans had a
new and wider loyalty to a world religion that cut across
both tribal and national loyalties.
a. Ghana
The first of the great west African empires was
Ghana. Ruled by the Soninke ethnic group, Ghana covered a
vast area bordered by the Senegal River to the West, the
Niger River to the east, the Sahara desert to th? north, and
to the south, the forest areas. The rulers of Ghana lain-
tained their traditicral religions but used Muslim officials
within their court to record events and enhance the prestige
of the king. So large was the Muslim contingent within
government that a separate Muslim ciry grew up outside the
capital cf Ghana.
At its peak, Ghana had the ability to fisld a
200,000 man army and was perpetually engaged in minor
conflicts. Gold was the primary trading coramodiry and it was
gold which first attracted Arab traders.
In 1076, Ghana was conquered by the Almoravids
who had allied themselves with ths small west African state
of Takrur. [69] As a result cf this conquest the inhabi-ants
cf Ghana were, largely, converted ro Islam and Islam became
the official state religion. After a series of historical
eoisodes in which Ghana evsntually reclaimed its indepen-
dence, [70] the empire cf Ghana slowly fell into decay and,
by the 13th century, had been replaced by another west
African power. As Ghara collpased, the Soninke people spread
throughout west Africa and became the most fervent prosely-




Ghana was replaced, in west Africa, by the great
Mandinka empire of Mali. Founded by the descendant of a
Soninke warrior, the empire of Mali eclipsed the total area
of Ghana, extending farther east along the Niger River and
penetrating deep into the Sahara desert in the north.
In 1260 A.D. the ruler of Mali went on
pilgrimage to Mecca, thereby, firmly esrabiishing Islam as
the stare religion. In 1324, Mali's most famous ruler, Mansa
Musa (1312-1337) made a great pilgrimage. During this
pilgrimage Mansa acccmplished several things which greatly
affectsd Hest African history. 0ns, enroute to Mecca he
con-iuered the huge trading center cf Timbuk-^u and brought
that city under the control cf Mali. Two, he managed to
spend so much gold during his travels that he devalued
Arabic currency. [71] Finally, he confirmed the presence of
Islam in west Africa to the Arabic world, thereby, enhancing
economic and oolirical ties with the Caliphate.
Within its borders, Mali provided a stable envi-
ronment where trade and commerce flourished. In conjunction
with the free flew cf trade there was a free flow of ideas
and a corresponding rise in the growth of Islam as the
people's religion.
Bv the 15th century Mali began its Icng period
of decline. Frought with internal unrest and numerous civil
wars, the great empire was eventually reduced to a series of
petty chieftaincies. "»ith the decline of Mali Islam disap-
peared from the Mande regions, except for Dyula and Soninke
tradinc colonies. During its decline, when kinship and
mystery cults held undisputed sway in all successor states,
teachers frcm the region sought new lives far outside its
boundaries. Many Islamic ccmmunities in northern Nigeria
attribute their conversion to missionaries from Mali. Thus,
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in spite of the weak position of Islam as a kinship cult,
Mali contributed to the Islamization of west Africa." [72]
Kali is credited with several achievements.
First,it was the largest empire in the contemporary world.
Secondly, it linked the Savannah states economically.
Finally, Muslim scholarship flourished, on a large scale,
among the urtan elites.
c. Kanem-Borno
The last great empire begun in this era was thai
of Kanem-Borno. This empire developed around Lake Chad, far
to the €ast of Ghana and Mali. It existed from, approxi-
mately, the 9th century until its fall in 1846.
Kanem-Bornc was principally a trading stats
dealing in gold, ivcry, and slaves. Its center was zhe
trans-Saharan trade route but its borders were somewhat
indistinct owing to its large nomadic constituency. In
effect, Kanem-Borno was a large confederation of noma'ds who
existed under an acknowledged ruling group.
Islam reached Kanem-Borno along th9 caravan
routes and was established as the state religion in the 1 l-ch
century by Mai (king) Hume, the thirteenth r'il=>r, who made
the pil-riin = q=. By -^he lat'= 12th and early 13th century
Islam had bsen accept=d by all the elite=- of ra!:^m-Bcrnc.
By the end of the 13t.h century the people of
Kanem-Bornc had n^erge^ into a single group, unified by the
Kanuri ianguace. By the 14th century this Kanuri speaking
group had been driven from Kanem, the capital, and forced to
resettle in Borne, southwest cf Lake Chad. However, by the
15th century, under Mai Ali Gagi, tha Kanuris (as they were
then called) had driven out the invading Bulala tribe and
consolidated the empire known as Kanem-Borno. Under this
consolidation a large portion of what is now northern





Prior to th?? 15th century rhe history of many
kinqdoms in west Africa is indistinct. The great-sst vciume
cf infcrma-ion exists concerning the three kingdoms just
discussed. However, several lesser kingdoms emerged during
this time; the most prominent was the development , of the
Haasa States in the central Sudan.
The Hausa comprise one of the larges- linguistic
groups in Africa, but, rhey do not comprise a.i ethnic unity.
Owing tc a complex set of circumstances [73] th^ Hausa
entity was able to extend the range ot its common language
and culture to enccmpass a number of city states known
ccllectivelv as the Hausa States.
The Hausa States were, actually, a series of
walled cities known as Birni, which existed as politcal
units peculiar to the central Sudan. The leaders of these
Eirni formed elaborate courts and built large cities which
tended to absorb the indigenous, i!omadic, Berber and Tuareg
populations. The Hausa city state of Kano became tne main
industrial center of' the region while Katsina became impor-
tant as the commercial hub cf the tra ns-Sahar an trade route.
In 1320, Katsina joined Islam. Islam had been
fairly late in arriving among the Hausa due tc an absence of
trade routes in the earlier centuries. Islam was introduced
during the reign of Ali (1349-1385) out turned out to be a
mere facade, [74] fcr when All's son Kanajejs , a pagan
worshipper, took the throne, Islam suffered a protracted
setback.
Islam re-emerged under Muhammad Bimfa
(1463-1U99) coming to the Hausa States from many direction,
including the pilgrini traffic, trade with North Africa and
western Sudan, and the political influence of the Songhai
and Kanam-Bomo empires. Tokclar clerics from west Sudan and
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Kanem-Borno , in the late 15th century, consideratly aided
the acccir.plishment of the urban raligious revolution in the
Hausa States. [75] The result of this Islamic resurgence was
that Kane and Katsina became centers of Islamic teaching and
gained considerable influence among Muslims in wesx Africa.
Of particular significance to this paper is that
the Hausa states became the heartland of northern Nigeria
and firmly established an Islamic tradition which persists
to this day. The roots of Islam and Islamic resurgence pre-
date, by centuries, the Nigerian Federation, and was the
vehicle of change well before the colonial incursions of the
late 19tb century and early 20th century.
3. Iii§l in i?§st Africa: ^Sth - Hth Century
It is the nature of west African history, as we know
it now, for time and events to overlap in a confusing
pattern cf empire building and empire decay. This next era
of Islamic history in west Africa introduces a new ei.pire
while continuing the story cf empires which began in the
centuries before.
a. The Songfcai Empire
The 16th century, in the history of the western
and central Sudan, was dominated by tha Songhai Empire. [76]
It became the largest empire ever created in tropical
Africa, replacing Mali, and bordered on the east by the
Hausa States and to the north and west by Morocco and the
Niger River respectively. In a thirty year period, under
their greatest leader, Sunni Ali (1464-1492), the Songhai
Empire ccnsclidated all of the lessar Savannah states and
the remnants of the Mali Empire.
Islam was the great, unsolved, problem of the
Songhai Eupire. Sunni Ali was a mixer or syncretist, A
syncretist atteaots to balance the worship of Allah with the
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worship of traditional gods. This practice was not accepted
fcy devout Muslims, among them the commander of the Empire's
army. General Muhammad. When Sunni Ali's son, Baru, ascended
the throne he proved to be more of a mixer than Ali.
Muhammad asked that Earu declare himself a Musliir. but he
refused and in 1U93, Muhammad attacked and overthrew Baru,
establishirq himself as the ruler of Songhai.
••This dispute between pure Muslim and the mixer
is very important in the history of west Africa. Anyone who
worships any god but Allah is considered a pagan and it is
legitinate for cure Muslims to wage Jihad against pagans.
Many kings in west African history became Muslims, but in so
doing, felt comcelled to maintain their role as head of the
traditional religions of the state, thereby, preserving th<^
loyalty of all their subjects." [77] It was this attempt to
blend Islam and traditional pagan religions which lead to
the reformist Jihads of the 19th csntury.
The Songhai Empire was consolidated under
Muhammad who, later, made the pilgrimage (a significant
event for west African Islamic leaders). Upon his return he
waged Jihad against his naighbors, many of whom were mixers.
Eventually, Muhammad conquered the Haasa States and, Islam
in a purer form, flourished in the vast Songhai Zmpire.
In 1590, Morocco invaded the Songhai Empire.
There were two practical reasons for this invasion. Ona, was
to gain control of Songhai's lucrative salt trade. The
ether, was so that Sultan Ahmad, of Morocco, would be able
to declare himself leader of the greater part cf Islamic
Africa through his control of both Morocco and Songhai. From
this position, he would be able to press his clain as
Caliph, or leader, of the Muslim world. Although the
Korcccans captured the capital of Songhai, they were never
able to qain firm control of the people. This inability to
establish clear control over the Songhai Empire became the




During this era the Kanem-Borno empire was
heavily troubled by the Hausa States (particularly Kebbi)
until the reiqn of Mai Idris Alooma, who secured the empires
borders and conquered most of the nomadic tribes of the
north.
Idris was a great military leader, a skillful
adminis-crator, and a devout Muslim. He built many mosques
and employed skilled judges to administer the Sharia law.
Above all, Idris was most adept at diploma^iic relations.
Through his skills he was able to play off the two grear.
rivals in North Africa, the Sultan of Morocco and t.hB ruler
of the Ottoman Emoire. By recognizing the Sultan of Morocco
as the supreme head cf the Muslim community he held off the
Ottoman Turks. When the Sultan conquered Songhai,
Kanem-Borno was left as the most powerful state in the
Sudan .
c, Hausaland
Kano and Katsina continued to dominate in
Hausaland until the early 16th century, when the Hausa
States were occupied by the Scnghai's. Then, in 1516, th^
Kanta (king) ^f Kebbi declared his independence from Songhai
and was atle to maictain that independence until 1804. By
the close of the 16th century Kebbi had gained control over
most cf Hausaland.
^« Islam ij3 West Africa: 17th - ^Bth Century
After the Mcrcccans defeated the Songhai Empire and,
as Kanera-Eoino began to decline, a period known as the dark
ages descended UDon west Africa. These dark ages preceded
the revolutionary years of the 19th century, whan reformist
Islamic ideas wculd be widely spraad throughout the ragion.
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Contrary to what the term implies, the dark agf=s in
west Africa were not cen-uries of chaos. Rather, they repre-
sented a period of time when an enormous power vaccum
existed. Nc state emerged to replace the Songhai Empire and
most cf West Africa was besieged by petty wars and internal
disorders. During these dark ages Islam slowly spread into
new areas. Islamic learning became more widespread and the
pattern of Muslim scholars serving in non-Islamic states
continued to influence west African kingdom builders.
Ey the 18th century West African Muslims had beccme
inspired by Muslim reformist ideas prevalent at the time.
From these ideas caie the ncticn cf Jihads as a means to
perpetrate the spread of Islam. In the 18th century the
first two Jihads occured in Futa Djallon and Futa Toro (in
what is now Senegal). The primary importance cf these two
encounters i»as as forerunners of the great Jihads of the
19th centurv, which brought much of west Africa under Muslim
control.
Futa Djallcn and Futa Toro represent the first
successful Jihads led by Fulani Muslim reformists. The Jihad
against Futa Djallon began in 1725 and lasted about half a
century before Islam was firmly established as the state
religion. The Jihad against Futa Toro began in 1776 and was
immediately successful; Replacing the non-Muslim leader with
an Islamic reformist.
a. Ha us aland
As the west African dark ages engulfed Hausaland
the pcwer of Kebbi began to wane and the states of Katsina
and Gcbir emeraed as the leading powers. Katsina became a
major center of Islaiic scholarship and in Gobir the first
demands for Islamic reform, in the Hausa States, were
scund€d. Ey the end cf the 18th century Gobir had emerged as
the most powerful Hausa state. Thus, the stage was set for




By the end of this era 'the once great empire of
Kanem-Borno had fallen into eccnomic, political, and mili-
tary decline. The only state in west Africa which could be
called Islamic was fading. Throughout this period Islam
spread and flourished under the patronage of the Hai's and
Kanem-Borno became a center of Islamic learning. [78]
As the 19th century began Kanem-Borno aided the
Hausa states against the Jihad forces of the Fulani
Reformists. Because cf this aide, Kanem-Borno was accused of
unbelief and the stage was set here, as in Hausaland, for
their eventual overthrow by the Jihadists.
5. Islam in West Africa: Jt9th Centurv Re form and Chang e
"Ths 19th century was the great cen-ury of Islamic
expansion in west Africa. In its more remote aspect zne
reawakening derives from Berber reaction to Arab conquest.
Iheir Islamic zeal -hrived on the by-products of Sufism, the
religious fraternities, and the cult of saints. Th^ actual
expansion was achieved by means of the alliance of the sword
and tha book. Militant clerics, reacting against the
Sudanese accomodation of Islam and paganism, proclaimed the
Jihad and found in the theocratic state a unique means for
the attainment of pcwer and the subjection to the state of
all the diverse elements incorporated in their
commonwealths." [79]
The story of 19th century Islamic reform movements,
in west Africa, is a story of personalities creating events.
It is possifcle to concentrate on three major Islamic leaders
cf this era and, thus, gain the flavor and immensity of
their acccm plishment s as well as an appreciation for the




a. The Jihads of Othman dan Podio
Without doubt, the greatest and most influential
cf the 19th century Jihad leaders was Uthman dan Fodic. A
Fulani cleric from the Hausa state of Gobir, Uthnan dan
Fodio tscame disenchanted with the nature of Islam in the
central Sudan and invoked the Jihad to institute a reformist
Islamic icvement.
Avoiding undue aggrandizement, it is nothing
short of iriraculous that Uthman dan Fodio was able to trans-
late his desires for a reformist Islamic movement into the
sco;:e of action that he did. In its simplest form, it may be
possibl? to analyze the success of Uthman dan Fodic based on
the factors which motivated him:
1. As a teacher and cleric Othman dan Fodio had an imme-
diate, near term, goal to rid Gobir and the other
Hausa sta-es of pagans.
2. A more encompassing mctivaticn was to purify Islam in
west Africa. Stemming from his rejection of rulers
who mixed both pagan and Muslim religions, Othman dan
Fodio souaht to cleanse Islam of the pagan practices
which had been in existence since, at least, the rule
of Sunni Ali in the Songhai Empire. It was this iroti-
vaticnal tool which was the hardest to rationalize,
and once done, the easiist to propogate.
In the strictest interpretation cf Islamic law
it is forbidden to wage Jihad against ether f^uslims.
However, Othman dan Fcdio happened upon several historically
for^uiticus events which allowed him to carry off this
apparent violation of Islamic law. First, the Muslim commu-
nities cf Hausaland, essentially Sufi fundamentalists,
resented the pagan practices of thair rulers. Second, most
of the massis resented the oppressions of their rulers and
were wiilinq to listen to someone who would lead the attack
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aqainst the opDr9ssors. Third, in conjunction with a
qaneral, tut unspecified belief among Muslims, that the
Mahdi will appear at the end of a given century Uthman dan
Fodio arose at a most propitious time and, even though he
disclaimed rumors that he was the Hahdi, he did claim to be
his forerunner.
Having once gained acceptance of the idea that
true Muslims were Muslims who acted in accordance with
guidelines which wers, necessarily, the guidelines of Uthnan
dan Fcdic it was easy to recruit Muslim leaders who sought
to foment their own revolutions against pagan overlords.
[801
3. It is not surprising that the Jihad leaders who
solicited the endorsement of Uthman dan Fodio were,
themselves, menibers of ths Fulani (Fulbe) e-^hnic
group. In the end, the accomplishment of Uthman dan
Fcdic was more a creation of a Fulani Islamic empire
than the creation of a theocratic stata. Because of
this Fulani ethnic identity, a frequent motivation
espoused for Dthamn dan Fodio 's Jihads has been the
perpetration of a race war to establish Fulani
regional dominance.
4. Lastly, the motivation for Jihad was land acquisition
and, in conjunction with the Fulani ethnic motiva-
tion, it was the acquisition of land to be controlled
by Fulani leaders.
The actual conduct of the Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio began in
1804. D€Clared as, "Commander of the Faithful," Uthnan dan
Fodio either led or spawned Jihads which, eventually,
brouqht together all cf west Africa between the Niger Fiver
and Lake Chad. The details of Uthman dan Fodio' s campaigns
are too numerous for the sc cpe of this paper. However, it is
sufficient to note that by 1817, most of wha"-. is now
northern Niceria looked to him for direction.
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The unification of the vast Hausa states area
was accomplished by the establishment of the Sckoto
Caliphate. By 1830 the Sokoto Caliphate had established the
frontiers it was to maintain, roughly in tact, throughout
the igth century. [ 81 ]
The decline of the Sokoto empire began scon
after its inception. Dthman dan Fodio died in 18 17 and left
the empire under the dual ccntrol of his brother and son.
Two capitals smerged, the greater in Sokoto and the lesser
in Gwandu. Muhammad Eelo, Uthraan dan Fodio's heir, main-
tained tie unity of the empire from his position in Sokoto
and under him education, commerce, and the arts flourished.
However, the inherent weakness of an empire with dual
control, the inability of Uthman dan Fodic to consolidate
his empire prior to his death, incessant raids from nothern
nomadic tribes, and the ravages of a war torn 3nvironmra'=nt
led to the demise of the Caliphate's great influence.
Com'jounding these problems was the fact tha:: the emirs who
succeeded those appointed by Urhman dan Fodio and Muhammad
Eelo became guilty cf the same abuses against which the
Jihad had been waged.
By 190U, the British occupied Sokoto and put an
end to the unrest which had spawned dissent. The Jihad broke
down and a oeriod of protracted peaca , under colonial domi-
nation, resulted in -^he consolidation of Islamic pcwer and
increased Islamic expansion throughout west Africa and,
specifically, northern Nigeria.
Uthman dac Fodio's effect on the spread of Islam
in west Africa is notable for its scope and purpose. For the
first tine in west African history Islam became the religion
cf the oeople and not just the elites. It was a brand of
Islam which, from its inception, was devoid cf compromis^^
and yet ::roaressive in its scope. The brand cf Islam intro-
duced intc west Africa was Sufism, and its concentration on
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ritual and mysticism as well as its adaptability to tradi-
tional religious practices made it particularly appealing to
the ccmmurjities cf west Africa,
Finally, in a narrower sense, the history of
Uthman dan Fodio is the history of Nigeria. He consolidated
the Hausa States into one Islamic region and set the stage
for the Islamic administrations which survived colonization
and still exist today. Thus, from the beginning, Islam in
Nigeria has been characterized by relatively violent periods
of activity which have concentrated on overthrowing oppres-
sive rulers and, only secondarily, asxablishing Islam as a
political and religious institution.
b. The Jihad of Se ku Ahmadu
The Jihad of Seku Ahmadu could most clcsely be
termed an independence movement. Seku Ahmadu was a Fulani
Muslim whc had been inspired by Uthman Dan Fodio and had
taker, part in the Jihads begun in 130U.
After spending seme time fighting with Uthman
dan Fcdic Seku Ahmadu returned to his homeland of Macina, in
central west Africa. He became a dissident in his homeland,
speaking cut against the pagan practices of the rulers of
Macina. He spawned a ircvement which gained momentum from two
sources. One was the traditional Muslim community which
wished to see the ccrrupt practices of their rulers put to
an ?nd. The second scarce was from the Fulani people who
lived in Macina. They perciev?d an opportunity, not only to
implement Islamic reform, but to gain independence from the
pagan Bamtara overlords.
By 1319, after a period of violent turmoil, Seku
Ahmadu gained control cf Macina. By 1826, he had expanded
the borders cf his kingdom northeast along the Niger Hiver,
to include the trading center of Timbuktu, within this
rapidly expanding empire, Seku Ahmadu devised an efficient
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systen of administration and iiDpossd a strict Muslim regims
upon his people.
Selcu Ahmadu died in 1862, leaving to his saccas-
sors a statle caliphate with a system of governmsnt based en
traditional Sharia law. However, in the year of his death,
after twenty years cf stability, the empire of Macina was
attacked and conquered by another wesr African Jihadist,
Al-Hajj 'Omar.
c. The Jihad of Al-Hajj Umar
Begun in 185U, the Jihads of Al-Hajj »Umar were
notable for two reasons. First, zhey were Jihads -hat
clearly resisted the incursions of ths French from the wast
coast of Africa. In this respec*, they became the first
violent confrontation, in west Africa, between Islam and a
colonial power.
Secondly, Al-Hajj 'Dmar waged one of his Jihads
against the Muslim state of Macina. The motivation for this
apparanr violation of Muslim law is found in the nature of
tha type of Islam embraced by Sl-Hajj 'Omar. He was a Sufi,
belonging to the Tijanniya Brotherhood, an order asserting
that its members aie spiritually superior to all other
Muslims and which encourages the idea that non-members are
unbelievers. The Tijanniya Brotherhood contrasted sharply
with thi C=idiriya Brotherhood, which was the most widsspread
in west Africa at the time. The Qadiriya order contained
most of the Muslim ruling classes within the western Sudan
(including the ruling class of Macina) and, they percieved
the Tijanniya as a threat to their position [82]
In 186 2, Al-Hajj 'Omar attacked the Macina
Caliphate. "From the Muslim point of view it was a irajor
traqedy that two Muslim Caliphates, that of 'Umar and
Ahmadu, should have clashed when there were non-Muslims





Ey the end of the 19th century, as a result of the
Jihad Dovemer-t s. Islamic states controlled almost all of
west Africa. They were states decimated by wars and internal
unrest and yet, withir this seeming chaos, there existed the
state structures necessary for the establishment of sound
administrations and efficient political control.
Thus, by the turn of the century, as the colonial
powers began their encroachments deeper into west Africa,
they found a land frcught with the turmoil of war's after-
math and particularly susceptible to colonial stabilization
efforts aimed at consolidation and efficient administration
of their empires. This was particularly true of the Nigerian
experience.
D. COLOBIAI SIGEBIA
The Muslim jihads had changed the character of west
African states. The Fulani conquests resulted in the
collapsa of the old Habe dynasties and their replacement
with Fulani emirates. The old administrative systems were
not entirely removed and many of the traditional positions
and titles remained. "It appears clear, however, that the
structure of governiert and administration was modified to
conform more closely to the Shari' a, and the Jihad did
succeed in setting up an Islamic imamate. This imamate
continued until the time of the British administration, and
in a modified form was retained under the British system of
indirect rule. " r84 ]
As vas already pointed cut the Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio
was social as well as religious. There were economic causes
as well as his dislike of the moral problems of oppression
and tyranny practiced by the old Habe rulers. However,
Othman dan Fcdio's primary ccncern was social reform in the

context of the Shari'a, "His pre-occupation was not with
temporal human welfare, but with, the Muslim economy of
salvation in relation to the whols Muslim community in the
Sudan." r 65 ] Unfortunately, evidence suggests that "reform
did not long survive the second generation of Dthman dan
Fodio's descendants. The Fulani emirs of the second half of
the 19th century had exchanged militant evangelism for mere
personal piety and had largely outlived the capacity of the
founders to order events and to enforce rhe change which had
been implicit in the Jihad." [86]
J.S, Triminqham points out the ultimate paradox between
Dthman dan Fodio's reformist Jihad, the laxity of its second
generation emirs, and the intrusion of British colonialism
when he states, "Islac enjoyed more favorable conditions for
expansion under colonial rule than at any other period of
history. During this period of stability Islam net mer-^ly
consolidated the gains made during the period of theocratic
conQuerers and states, but also spread far beyond its former
confines. European occupation aided this outburst both
through tie direct action of the administrations and the
conditions deriving frcm that occupation." [87]
"The example of foreign rule offered to Nigerian Muslims
during colonial rule revealed that there was an alternative
to government under theocratic institutions and that inde-
pendence and the desired social and economic development
could not be maintained by Jihadist revivals. The Muslim way
of life could be subjected to change without any offense to
the tenets of the religion as expressed in the Qur'an and
Sunna. The colonial government generally tolerated and
respected Islam where it predominated as the religion of the
people and restrained proselytizing by Christian missions in
the interest of public security. Orthodox sects were also
supocrtcd for similar reasons, to discourage the emergence
of Mahdism and other movements." [38]
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Bithir. this climate the spread of Islam by force of arms
was stopped, but it continued to spread by peaceful nisans
engulfinq converts at a ration of about tan to one [89]
versus Christianity. This rapid growth of Islam was a direct
result of four major factors. One, the isolation of the
north specifically precluded the introduction of Christian
missionaries. Two, the appeal of Islam, to the pagan peoples
of Nigeria had remained constant since its introduction
several centuries before. The elements of mysticism and
ritual in conjunction with the accepted institution of poly-
gamus marriages widely appealed to the native population.
Thirdly, the tenets of Islam remained simple in opposition
to the difficult process of training required by the
Christians. Lastly, the relative stability of the British
colonial administration provided an excellent medium for The
growth of Islam. Proselytizing, as a basic tenet of the
religion, was made easier within the confines of an adminis-
tration whose fundamental requirement was the maintenance of
order and conflict avcidance. 3ut, as Nigeria progressed
towards independence the single mosr important political
entity which began tc emerge was the dynamism of ethnc-
regional politics . Islam, from powerful beginnings, failed
tc materialize as a viable political force.
E. iBAT IS FOBDAHENTALISM IN NIGERIA TODAY
With the rise of ethno-regicnal politics and '-he decline
of Islam (as a force for charge in Nigeria Islam declined
throughout the colonial period ) and with the subsequent
tumultuous years that followed the declaration of indepen-
dence: It is somewhat disconcerting to note an increase in
the activities of Islamic groups within Nigeria. "The Muslim
fundamentalism spreading there is not a purely spiritual
matter. The interaction of religion and political power
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seems evident. in certain respects - size, demography, and
resources - Nig.eria is reminescent of Iran." [90]
In the aftermath of the -religious violence cf the last
two years the spectre of religious intolerance looms at a
dangerously high level in Nigeria. "The emotion aroused by
the riots provoked a more serious analysis of the Islamic
situation in Nigeria. The Yen Izala was only one fundamen-
talist grouD in Northern Nigeria and stood out because of
their violent me-hods. The spread of fundamentalism in the
last twenty years was directly linked to a certain erosion
cf traditional authority and the growing seriousness of
economic and political problems in Nigeria today." [91]
"*
• Nigerian Pundamenta lism-Tha Plajers
The new admiristrat ive structures of the federation
after the 1966 coup d'etat divided the country into twelve
and then nineteen states. This helped create a feeling cf
Islamic unity which transcended the regional level and
rested at the national level. The Association of Mcsiem
students (founded in 1954 and based in Lagos and the south-
west since, with over 400 chapters) has insisted that the
idea of doctriJial orthodoxy is the only basis for
integration.
The federal government acknowledged the stiudent's
move towards Islamic unity by creating a Supreme Nigerian
Council for Islaiaic Affairs in 1973. This institution repre-
sented the government's attempt to channel the development
cf Muslim affairs and join political and religious ortho-
doxy. HoMever, this council's protsction was never extensive
enough for Nigerian diversity which consisted mainly of the
relationship between the continuing authority of the emirs
in northern Nigeria and the leadership of the brotherhoods.
The brotherhoods had to be eliminated as they appeared to be
the greatest obstacles to Muslim integration. There was an
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attempt tc show the Ecn-Islamic nature of the brotherhoods
which could be compared to the work of sects like
Mait.esine's, whose targets were not only the leaders of the
brotherhoods but also traditional leaders of Islam, materi-
alism, and worldliness.
The Aniagolu tribunal noted several conflicts and
incidents between the followers of Gummi, Yen Izala, the
Moslem Association of Nigeria and other fundamentalists, and
the brotherhoods during the 1977-1980 period. The Emir of
Kano told the court that, although traditions had been swept
away. In general pecple respect their traditional leaders.
In the interest of law and order, the statute on traditional
leaders must be restcred."
In Nigeria, traditional religious leadership has
been integrated with social leadership in modern political
structures but fundamentalists there (some of whom want to
create an Islamic nation) pose a complex threat tc the
stability of the current power structure in the north and
throughout the federation. The fundamentalists' position is
strengthened by the contrast between the obvious materialism
and worldliness of the traditional leaders and the aztitude
of contetcpcrary political leaders who, in the majority,
believe in Islam.
Without doubt, poor, oppressed people can be manipu-
lated bv clever leaders especially when this manipulation
has the bias of the current religious renewal (revival) of
Islam, a religion known for its mobilizing power.
Nevertheless, the prospect of an Islamic nation in Nigeria
seems out of the guestion because of the divisions between
the north, governed by the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy, the
southwest by the Yoruba and the east by the Ibos, not to
mention the many ethnic minorities. The C .nstitution of
Nigeria sticulates religious freedom, but in the light of
recent evenxs, public proselytism has been regulated. It
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constitutes a response; an attempt to control the thrust of
fundamentalism.
Officially, religious fanaticism is deplored "rspe-
cially when it infringes on the sphere of influence cf cne
party or ancther. Yet, politically and socially, Nig'^rian
fundamentalism seems to be an extreme response tc the intol-
erable gap tetween pious, religious and political desires
and the country's social realities,
Finally, as Feter D. Clarice of Kings College, London
states, "Fundamentalism has been gaining ground in Nigeria
in recent years for a number of reasons, one of the main
ones being that more people have come to see it as the most
useful ideology for a society undergoing considerable, if
not profound, dislocation in every sphere, as a result of
the rapid pace of industrialization." [92] Islamic fundamen-
talism in Nigeria, today, may offer itself as a blueprint
for change and a solution for the myriad social, economic,
and political problems confronting that nation.
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I?. ETHNICITY AMD CHAHGE
The growth of ethnicity as a powerful force in the
political struggle within Nigeria has, at its roots, th*?
colonial pclicias propagated by Sir Frederick Lugard and
fostered ty his successors. Chapter Two of this papar is a
history of not only the emergence of independent civilian
rule in Nigeria tut also of the birth and growth of ethno-
regional politics.
Within the chronclcgy of Nigerians eventual rise to self
government several significant policies and events highlight
the long period of ethnic divergence which has dominated the
political tenor of Nigerian government.
Certainly, the premier event in the process of ethno-
legional separation within Nigeria was the policy of
Indirect Rule perpetrated tfy British Colonial leaders. More
than any single policy this method of government served to
divide and isolate the major ethnic divisions within Nigeria
and instead of building the foundation for a united Nigeria
it lead to a type of tri-regional osification which has
persisted to the present; effectively separating
Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruta both territorially and ideolo-
gically. The developojent of a sense of national unity gave
way to the development of regional powerbases with a corre-
sponding suppression or incorporation of the multifarious
minority ethnic groups scattered throughout the three tra jor
ethnc-pclit ical regions.
By far, the largest ethnic grouping is the Hausa-Fulani.
Comprised primarily ci nomadic tribesmen and converted city
dwellers the Hausa-Fulani were the first group affectsd by
Britain's colonial policies and largely through these poli-
cies became isolated from the more progressive Ibc and
Yoruta ethnic divisicns located in the south of Nigeria.
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Although large, the Hausa-Fulani were less educated than
their southern neighbors and lore thoroughly indoctrinated
in traditional Musliin religious training. Their sys-cem of
government was ideally suited to British administrative
methods and as their religion grew so to did their broad
ethnic base.
Attempts by Britain 'to bring the Ibo» s and Icruba's
under the colicy of indirect rule within the construct of
the 19 ia Amalgamation Plan proved egually destructive to
Nigerian national unity and resulted in the enhancement of
regional separatism and the evolution of a Nigerian ccmmu-
nity which shared little in ccmmon, oxher than gcvernmsnt by
Britain. Characterized by ethnic tension the policy cf indi-
rect rule served tc undermine the fabric of Nigerian
nationalism. "
The constitutional evolution within Nigeria's political
history, ud to the 1979 Constitution, is a history that
served tc enhance Niceria*s ethnic diversity. The Richards
Constitution of 1945 provided the key first step in the
development of regional politics by first incorporating the
north into the central legislature and then by creating
regional councils for the north, east, and west. The creation
of these regional ccuncils has been severely criticized as
being the foundation cf tribalism in Nigerian politics.
The fcllow-on Macpherscn Constitution of 1952 further
enhanced the regional separatism initiated by the Fichards
Constitution. As previously stated, the constitutional
convention which met to construct the aacpherson document
was centered on what type of regional government to adopt
and net on creating a strong central administration. The
north remained staunchily tied to continued British control
while the south pressed for greater self government. It was
during this time that the effects of the north's isolation
under indirect rule began to emerge as impediments to
Nigeria's progress towards national unity and independence.
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The fcllow-on Constitution cf 1954 served to strengthen
the separatist trend by regionalizing the civil service and
the judiciary. Most residual powers were transferred to the
three regions and in this fashion Nigeria moved awkwardly
into independence carrying with it the central issues of
ethno-regional politics.
The culmination, but not the end, of these years of
ethnic separatism was the 1967-1970 civil war. It was inevi-
table that one regicn should attempt to throw off the
cumbersome yoke of an ineffective central government and
attempt to create a cew state. The threat was grave to the
very existence of the en-ity known as Nigeria. The violence
was cataclysmic and the effects are still felt today. Eut
even the resolution cf the civil war did no-i: yield a solu-
tion to the ethnic pclitics which dominated Nigeria's pclit-
ical existence.
The ensuinq years of military rule leading to the 1979
Constitution and subsequent election ware frought with exam-
ples of ethnic tension. However, the new constitution
provided a medium in which the continuance of ethno-regional
political activity was to be abated. Most cer-ainly, the
requirement that the president garner twenty five percent of
the vote in two thirds of the states was a dramatic effort
to assuage ethnic politics.
Sinc€ the inception of the 1979 Constitution several
events have transpired to indicate the lessoning cf ethnic
politics in Nigeria. First, the conduct of the 1979
elections (see chapter two, this paper) resulted in a
nationally elected president who met the requirements for
cross regional election. Ensuing illegations of political
gerrymandering notwithstanding, the net result was Nigeria's
first nationally elected president. Just as important was
the success of the president in maintaining his office
through constitutional means and without the aide of a
91

nilitaiy all too faiiliar with the process of running the
nation. Ultimately, despite criticisms from opponents, the
new system appeared tc be working.
A second significant event on the long road to dismerober
regional politics was the return of Ojukwu, the exiled
leader of the Republic of Biafra. Ojujcwu's return symbolized
several actions. First, it served to symbolically end the
civil *ar which was over but not forgotten. - Secondly, it
demonstrated the confidence President Shagari felt in his
powers as president. Finally, it had the effect of drawing
all Nigerians closer as the old wounds created by ethnic
diversity and regional politics began to finally heal.
For his part, Cjukwu aided the healing process in
several key ways. First, he did not engage in in any
disruptive rhetoric. Second, he endorsed the policies of
President Shagari, a northerner. Finally, he joined tha NFN,
Shaqari's party, and not th« Ibo party, while preaching the
efficacy cf unity within Nigeria.
Thus, the cycle had come full turn. Ojukwu, leader of
the rebellious seccessionists; defeated, exiled, and
returned to a position in the party that, was comprised of
the northerners he had so despised. It would not be
surprising to find Cjukwu on the NPN's next presidential
ticket, garnering a wide following from both the northern
consti tutency and his Ibo homeland. He could come to
symbolize a truely significant advancement in the demis= of
ethno-regional politics.
On another front, the drive by many minorities to create
new states Dortends a desire to break-up the old regional
hegemonies and provide f cr a larger political bas^ in
Nigeria. Eased on proposals submitted in late 1982 to the
House and Senate the total number of states in Nigeria would
be raised tc forty eight. The power of the three traditional
regions seems to be waning against the onslaught of the
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determined minorities intent on gaining control of their own
political destinies.
Finally, the recently completed 1983 elections provide
further proof of the survival of the system and the
continued atrophy of ethno- regional politics. Shagari was an
easy winner, garnering a guarter of the votes in sixteen of
the nineteen states. Orderliness was the norm, as violence
was relegated to a few isolated incidents. As with the 1979
elections the 1983 elections have been plagued by the atten-
dant allegations of corruption, tampering, and rigging.
However, as in 1979, Shagari has answered these questions
while maictaining his power, based on the Constitution, and
not on the influence of the military or any other non-
political force. The end result, although still being weakly
constesxed, seems to be that constitutional government has
again successfully net the challenges of an election in
Nigeria. Bith each new victory for the system, the prospects
of returning to a system controlled by ethnic rivalries and
regional powers seems to grow ever weaker.
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V. THE NIGERIAN BCOSQHT
Nigeria's economy has recovered impressively from the
strains imposed by the 196 7-70 Civil War. Buoyed by large
oil earnings that provide most of the governments revenue
and foreign exchange earnings Nigeria has begun working
towards economic self-sufficiency.
Oil, by far Nigeria's most important resource, was
discovered in 1950. Ey 196 6 nineteen million tons was being
produced and in 1970, despite the Civil War, over fifty
million tens.
The canqer of this oil bccm was threefold. One, Nigeria
was deprived of manufacture, since most of the oil operation
consisted of the expert of crude petroleum. Two, the oil
boom left the Nigerian economy dependent on outside control.
[93]
Three, • the Nicerian government became increasingly
dependent on the revenues gained form the oil companies with
the consequence that it lost control of National economic
policy.
Nigeria, after becoming an OPEC member, began to peg its
future qrowth on the prospects of continued oil revenues
similar tc those experienced in 1973-1974 at the heighth of
the OFEC price increases. Later in this paper the fallacy of
an eccncmic policy tied to oil income will be illustrated.
In ccn junction with the rapid rise in oil production
Nigeria's once prosperous agricultural sector dwindled to
below subsistence levels. Prior to the 1973-1974 OPEC price
increases Nigeria was a net exporter of agricultural prod-
ucts tc include ground-nuts, cocoa, and palm oil. 70
percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture
producing 85 percent of the country's exports. As of 1981
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Nigeria had conpletely reversed that trend and had beccma a
maior importer of food.
The manufacturing sector centers around primary sx^.rac-
tion or processing of export goods, but the manufacxure of
consumer goods is on the rise. Among the larger industrial
operations are cement factories, lumber and plywood mills,
three petroleum refineries, and a steel mill.
Of Nigeria's mineral resources only tin, coal, and
columbite in additicn to petroleum are presently exported.
Bard mineral production constitutes a very small portion of
the nations income. Coal, iron, and limestone deposits have
resulted in the establishment of an infant stsel industry
with a promising future.
Nigeria's economic growth , since independence, has been
tied to the federal government's development plans. In the
first five years after independence (1960-1965) the growth
rate of GDP (Gross Dcmestic Product) at constant prices
surpassed the U-5 percent level which was the average for
the preceding decade under colonial rule. Hcwev9r, govern-
ment spending and private investment had already begun to
declii^e and had slumped to under 3% by the outbreak of civil
war in mid 196 7.
Generally speaking, the approach to development planning
in Nigeria crier to 1970 was characterized by underspending
and weak administrative control as reflected in the First
National Development Elan (1 962-1 968) . The Second National
Cavelcpment Plan (1970-1974) extended to 1975, emphasized a
higher level of agricultural output, rural development,
improved infrastructure, and measures tc combat unemploy-
ment. In the first plan great reliance had been placed en
foreign aid with only 20 55 of public investment financed from
domestic sources. Under the second plan this proportion was
80%. Total investment under the second plan was N5,300
million as opposed tc a total expenditure in th=5 first plan
95

of 798 million Nigerian pounds. The growth rate between 1970
and 1974 projected at 7 percent was in fact 8.2 percent per
annum in real terms.
The Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) just
completed, originally envisaged a total investment cf seme
N30,000 ttillion cf which about N20,000 million was to come
from public sectors. The plan aimed at an average annual GDP
growth rate of 9,^% in real terms with a revised target
growth rate of 9.556 in 1979-1980. Additionally, the plan
called for an overall GNP per capira increase from N205 to
N27a and emphasized rural development and increased food
production as well as social services and education. By 1976
the plan had been revised to encourage housing, health and
aqrical-ural development. In 1977 revised estimates indi-
cated it would take NU2, 000 million of investment (up
N12,000 lillion from the original plan) and require N26,500
million in rublic investment (up N6,500 million) to sucess-
fully cciFlete the third National Developmem: Plan.
The Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) fore-
casts expenditures of N70, 5000 million and a 42% growth of
GDP over five years. Agriculture is given the highest
priority, tut the plan expects the country zo remain depen-
dent en food imports. Mining, including oil, is expected to
fall as a proportion cf public investment. The Plan has been
developed partially in response to the world oil glut and
diminishing oil revenues. The impact of oil on the Nigerian
economy and the prospects for economic recovery under the
Fourth National Development Plan will be discussed next.
A. OIL ISD THE FOUHTH NATIONAL DEVELOPBEST PLAH
Nigeria is a classic example of the oil syndrome.
Arising in the mid-1970' s, the oil syndrome affliction is a
relatively recent pkenomencn. The only nations in west
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Africa who were established as major oil exporters early
enough tc develop most of the symptoms are Nigeria and
Gabon, Nigeria's pre-oil economy was one of Africa's most
vigorous, with real GDP growing at an annual rate cf U. 5%.
Agriculture was the leading economic sector, as Nigeria was
one of the worlds largest exporters of peanuts, palm oil,
and cocoa. Nigeria's manufacturing sector had grown from one
percent cf GDP in 1950, to five percent in 1964. Over the
same period, expansion of the money supply averaged about U
percent. In short, Nigeria's economic prospects seemed
encouraging.
Following the 1967-1970 civil war, which decimated
Nigeria's manufacturing and agriculture sectors, oil income
shot up dramatically, from $189 million in 1964 tc almost
$24 billicn in 198 1. The rapid influx cf foreign exchange
had two immediate and disasterous effects on the Nigerian
economy.
1. In order to spread more of the new wealth to urban
workers, Nigeria's central bank kept the exchange
rate of the dciestic currency (naira) unr=;alisticaily
high.
2. The policy of lassive public spending, tempered only
by the government's physical ability to organize the
handing out cf contracts, unls=sed a self -perptuat ing
cycle of hyper-inflation. .
Conseguently , foreign goods became steadily less expensive
in naira (N) terms compared to domestic goods, spoiling the
markets for domestic producers, driving savings out of the
country, and increasing the incentive for smuggling. In this
respect, oil allowed Nigeria to multiply its exports in
dollar terms by ten times in ten years, and its imports by
eleven times.
While oil earnings were rising to claim over 90 percent
of Nigeria's total foreign exchange, agriculture and
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manufacturing shrank from 5 8 percent of total GDP in 1964 to
20 percent in 1980. Nigeria, which was once the region's
largest fcod exporter, now has one of the most staggering
food production problems in West Africa. Following the sharp
increase in government spending in the early 1970s, thou-
sands abandoned farming for higher paying jobs in the
cities, and Nigeria plunged from food self-sufficiency tc a
nation dependent upon cv-er $2.2 billion in annual imports of
rice, frczen chickens, and other foods. To date, all
programs initiated by the government to stimulate agricul-
ture have failed because the prices offered to farmers have
teen significantly less than it cost them to produce their
croDS and less than they could make by working in town.
Insxead of greater economic independence, buiir on the
petroleum bonanza, Nigeria has developed a monocultural
dependency and faces the dilemma that it is less self-
reliant today than when it became independent 22 years ago.
By placing so much emphasis on its oil wealth and by seeking
to use that wealth tc satisfy the rising level of demands
emanating from their country's deeply divided regional and
ethnic groups, the actions of Nigeria's political leaders
have exacerbated the problems associated with the oil
syndrome. Unlike Mexico, Nigeria has not yet begun to mort-
gage its future by using its oil reserves as collateral for
large scale international borrowing to finance growing
government expenditures. However, future Nigerian leaders
may find this a difficult trap to avoid as societal demands
continue to escalate.
The Fourth National Development Plan recognizes the
problems caused by the oil syndrome and because over 90
percent cf Nigerian export revenues come from oil, the
economy presents planners with a tough problem. Slight move-
ments in international markets have proportionally larger
impacts en the Nigerian economy. A war in the Middle East
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can £€nd export revenues sky high as oil prices ris*?. A
western recession, like the present one, can cut oil demand
and drain Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves. In such an
unpredictable environment, economic planners mxisz be far-
sighted, flexible, and disciplined.
When Nigeria set cut its draft for the 1981-1985 devel-
opment plan, it anticipated that oil production would remain
above 2m barrels per day, with exports of about 1.9ni bpd,
selling at 136 a barrel. This seemed reasonable at the time
as prcducticn was running ever 2m bpd with a price cf $U0
per barrel. The forecast seemed sensible. Then in 198 1, the
international oil glut struck as Western economies* demand
for oil drcpped in the face cf the raccession. By August
1981, production had dropped to 700,000 bpd and Nigeria
began to cffe.r concessions to cus-comers. The measure worked
and ty December 1961 production was back to 1.8m bpd,
selling near $36 per barrel. fit xhat time British oil began
xc undercut Nigeria's sales and by the end of March 1932
produc'ticn was down to 630,000 bpd. Nigeria was reduced tc a
months worth of impcrt cover as the import bill outpaced
export revenue by N21,500m per month. The defici- reduced
Nigeria's external revenues from N5,767.6m at the end of
June 1981 tc a little over N1,200m by March 1982.
In March 1982 the Nigerian government reacted by
imposina the following import restrictions: 1) suspension cf
new letters of credit and ' M' forms which are essential for
the processing of new import orders. 2) Spare parts and raw
materials previously exempted from pre-shipment inspection
would new reguire full inspection. These were interim meas-
ures designed to permit the government to examine its
economic position and draw up long term plans. In April 1982
the government announced its program. Basically, the govern-
ment closed all private docks and increased customs surveil-
lance to curb smuggling, recalled ail unused import
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licenses, suspended issuance of import licenses for various
commodities, instituted compulsory advance deposits on all
imports, increased the price of gas by 25%, • increased
interest rates by two percent, increased tariffs by 5-10
percent, and announced stif fer inspection requirements.
These protection iiieasur.es drew much international criti-
cism but Nigeria has announced that as a result of these
measures balance of payments should show a surplus by the
end of 1983. Although foreign exchange reserves at the end
of May 1982 stood at just ever N740m, only sufficient tc
cover two week imports at the pre-restriction levels, the
downward spiral is under control while the level of imports
is expected to drop from pre-restriction levels of N1,200m
to N800m per month.
Another response to Nigeria's oil revenue shortfall
problem was its program of foreign borrowing and revenue
raising. Though Nigeria declined Saudi Arabia's offer of $1
billion it did draw 1140 million froji the IMF to support its
reserves. A $217m lean was signed with- London for internal
prelects and an $80 million dollar Euromarket loan was
financed by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company tc build
a polypropylene plant.
In June 1982 oil production began to recover. It hit its
highest level since January 1982, at 1.65ffl bpd and appeared
to be on course for an average production of 1.3m bpd for
1982 which would equal the OPEC quota allocated to Nigeria.
Unfortunately, oil experts continued to decline ana Nigerian
production fell below 1m bpd. OPEC refused to lower its
prices which were generally running at $35,00 per barrel by
the end of 1982. The final straw was the influx of North Sea
oil onto an already glutted market, at $30.00 per barrel.
By February 1983, Nigeria was forced to lower its oil
prices despite OPEC protests. This move can only be viewed,
in hindsight, as an act of economic survival and cannot be
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construed as an attempt by Nigeria to foster a role an an
OPEC dissident.
By mid 1983, Nigeria's price cuts had the desired affect
of raising demand for its high quality crude and production
returned to the OFEC minimum requirement of 1,3m bpd.
However, at $30.00 per barrel this production figure will
continue to greatly hamper Nigerian efforts for de:):elopment
as outlined in the Fourth National Development Plan.
The 1983 oil crisis reinforced Nigeria's need to diver-
sify and the 1961- 1S65 development plan makes this need a
top priority. The following is a run-down of the salient
points of the develop ment plan:
1. Industry - Both manufacturing and construction have
grown rapidly since independence. Despite this
qrowth, manufacturing still accounts for a relatively
sirall proportion of GDP {S% in 1979-1980) , although
construction accounts for about 13 percent of the
GDE. Production is mainly of importing substituting
consumer goods and takes* place behind a screen of
protectionist policies. Greater emphasis is now being
Dlac€d on consumer durables such as cars, capital
aoods, and heavy industries such as sxeel and
petrc-chemicals.
The textile industry has been the most important manu-
facturing sector but has suffered recently from • smuggled
imports. Rubber, brewing, aluminum, and tin products (to
name a f€w) are also important, A pulp and paper mill is
being established in conjunction with a newsprint factory.
In Karch 1979, Leylard Nigeria, opened its first domestic
vehicle assembly plant with another opening occurring in
1980. By 198U five more vehicle assembly plants, owned by
various corporations, are scheduled for opening.
By 1985 Nigeria is expected to require in excess cf 'Am
tons of steal. fin iron and steal industry is being
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established now, to cope with this expected demand. With aid
from the USSR, Nigeria plans to have its own planr by 1933.
The 1572 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Deer ee, «x*€nded
and strengthened in 1976 involves three categories of firms.
Schedule I must be 100% Nigerian owned and includes most
small businesses. Schedule II must be 60% Nigerian owned and
includes tanking, insurance, construction industries, and
mining. Schedule III (since 1979) includes agri-businesses
and food production companies and mus:: be 40% Nigerian
owned. Currently this decree is being selectively relaxed to
encouraae foreign private investment in neglected sectors,
such as large scale agriculture.
The Fourth National Development Plan expects industry to
grow by at least 15% per year, up from the 25% annual growth
in 1979 and 1980. lo assist in manufactur ing , the direct
investment in industrial development will concentrate on
creatinq the basic industries that can provide inputs for
manufacturers. Agribased industries are to recieve special
attention.
2. Mining - The share of mining in the GDP has been
rising rapidly over the last decade and equalled 25
percent in 1S78-1979. Ihe mineral commodities vary
from the alluvial gold deposits in the west and the
t.ir. mines in the north to the coal, lead, zinc and
oetroleum deposits in the east, midwesi: and conti-
nental shelf.
The production of crude petroleum, which was first
discovered in Nigeria in 1956, increased rapidly from 13.3m
tons in 1S65 to 111.6m tons in 197U. Since then the level
of production has varied widely, according to the sta-*-.e of
+he world market. Average liftings reached 2. 25m bpd in
1974 but then slumped to 1.56m bpd in the first half of
1975, owing to slack demand. Thereafter, production rose,
only to fall again in 1978. There was a recovery in 1979,
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with production reaching a record average of 2. Um bpa in
the first half of the year, but in 1981 the indusry hit the
worst trough of all, and output slumped to 600,000 bpd at
one pcint. A partial recovery at the end cf the year gave
way to a new slump ir early 1982. These peaks and troughs
have been related to CPEC price increases. During 1979 and
1980 Nigeria increased the price of oil several times, in
line with OFSC pclicy. In March 1982 the price of Nigerian
light was $36.50 per barrel, putting it at the top of the
OPEC scale.
Production costs for Nigerian oil are three tc seven
times as much as in the Middle East, but it has an excep-
tionally low sulphur content. In the first half of 1981
Nigeria was the sixth largest producer of crude oil in the
world, and the largest in Africa, accounting for about 3% of
total world producticr. Its proven reserves amount to about
twenty yesrs at the current lift rate, but new finds could
raise total reserves to as much as 50,000m barrels. The
U.S. is the main customer for Nigeria's oil taking more than
cne- third of exports. The Netherlands and France are also
important customers.
Until 1964 the entire output of Nigeria's crude oil was
exported. With the completion and operation of the 6C,Q00
barrels-a-day refinery at Port Harcourt in 1965 a small
propcrticn cf the crude oil production started tc be refined
in ccuntry. A second oil refinery at Warri in Bendel State,
went on stream in September 1978, and now produces 100,000
tpd. It is wholly owned by the NNPC. A third refinery with a
daily capacity of ICC, 000 bpd has been built in Kaduna and
was commissioned in 1980. A fourth refinery is now planned.
With demand increasing by 2535 annually, Nigeria suffers
shortages of refined products. A network of pipelines is
being built, for transporting refined products from Warri
for distribution in the north, and for transporting crude
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from the coast to the refinery in Kaduna. The first section,
from W'arri to Kaduna, ' was completed in 1978. In December
1979, the federal government nationalized the U.S. owned
Esso Standard company and used it as a distribution organ.
The prospects for mining natural gas appear bright with
proven reserves totalling 2,125m cubic meters but, at
present, only about 10% of the gas produced is used, while
the rest is flared off. There ware plans to build a gas
liquefication plant, with a daily capaci-y of at least
1,600in cubic feet. For this project, a company called Eonny
LNG was set-up in 1S78. The NNPC owned 69% of its shares
with the rest distributed among various foreign investors.
In February 1980 a twenty year supply agreement was signed
with a European consortium for 800m cubic feet per day,
starting in 198U. Ihe viability of the project depends on
the sale of a further 800m cubic feet per day to four US
distributers. Negotiations with the US government broke down
in 1980. A further setback occurred in 1981 when the outline
of the government's 1981-1985 development plan deferred
major putlic expenditure on the project until the second
half of the decade. In consequence, the Benny LNG consortium
temocrarily broke up.
Coal was the first commercial energy source to be
exploited in Nigeria. It has been produced in Eastern
Nigeria since 1915. From then until 1959 production
increased gradually tc a peak of 900,000 tons. With reduc-
tion in demand, production fell steadily to 237,000 tons in
1975. It rallied to 565,00 tons by 1977 but then continued
i-s downward trend, falling to 155,^*77 -ons in 1980. The
coal industry is undergoing reorganization tc raise produc-
tivity. Capacity of the two mines operated by the Nigerian
Coal Corporation is estimated at one million tons per year.
Other minerals include tin ore, columbite, lead, gold,
zinc, tungsten, marble, lignite and limestone. Reserves of
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iron ore discovered at Itakpe in Kwara State are estimated
at 86-105 million tons and are expected to form the basis of
Nigeria's future ircn and steal industry. Until the
discovery of petroleum the tin industry on the Jos Plateau
formed the taclcbcne of the country's mining industry. Almost
all the tin ore is smelted locally at Jos. Production cf tin
concentrates declined from a peak of 13,240 me-ric tons in
1968 to 2,530 metric tons in 1980. Tin deposits in Kano
State are to be exploited in a N25m project which is
expected to raise tin output substantially. Nigeria is the
leading producer of cclumbite, supplying approximately 95%
of the world's industrial requirements. Production cf cclum-
fcite was 1,312 metric tons in 1975 h\iz only 550 metric tons
in 1979.
Apart from the cil industry, the government (in the
Fourth National Develcpment Plan) pains to develop Nigeria's
natural gas reserves. Nigeria will also begin tc develop
its own petrochemical industry to begin meeting internal
reguirements. Additionally, a steel production capacity is
expected to develop within the decade.
3. Aariculture - Agriculture was the most important
sectcr of the Nigerian economy until the 1960 's when
the central stimulus of growth in the Nigerian
eccncay began to shift. Since the civil war, agricul-
ture has been completely overtaken by the petroleum
industry as the engine of growth. Agriculture
(together with livestock, forestry, and fishing)
contributed about 61 .2% of the GDP at current factor
costs in 1962. By 1980 its contribution nad declined
tc 21X. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector
continues to be of cruicial importance in providing
employment fcr over half of Nigeria's total work-
force, food to meet the needs of an increasing popu-
lation, and raw materials for the expanding
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industrial sector. The government has introducad a
number of measures to increase both private invest-
ment (includinc foreign investment) and foreign aid
in the sector. The Federal Government will bear up to
H0% cf the cost of private sector agri-projects and
hcpes to attract the interest of US investors.
Currently, the World Eank is assisting a national
feed plan.
Agricultural products constituted about four-fifths of
the tctal value cf exports in 1960. By 1970, however, their
value had dropped to 44% of total export earnings, ar.d in
1978-1979 they had accounted for only 6% of the total. This
decline as a proportion of total value of exports is due not
only to the spectular growth of crude oil exports bxiz also
to the cocr performance of the agricultural sector resulting
from drough-^, low producer prices, and the competition for
skills and labor from other sectors of the economy, prima-
rily cil related industries.
The main agricultural ccmmodities in the commercial
sector used to be cocoa, groundnuts and groundnut oil, palm
kernels, rubber, cotton and cottonseed, palm oil and timber.
Now, cocoa is the only agricultural export of any signifi-
cance. Until 1973 Nigeria was the world's second largest
producer cf cocca (axter Ghana) but it now produces only
about 11J{ cf the world total. World prices fell heavily in
1980 when the International Cccoa Agreement broke up. The
decline continued in 1981 and by November prices were about
1% below the level cf the previous year. In 1977-1978 the
harvest improved to 2G2,000 tons, from 165,000 tons in the
previous year, but fell to only 117,000 tons in 1978-1979.
In 1979-1980 producticn rose again to 176,000 tons bat was
tack down to 155,000 tons in 1981. Under a rehabilitation
scheire sponsored by the World Sank, new plantations have




Groundnuts are grown mainly in the north, on peasant
holdings. Until 1972 Nigeria was Africa's leading groundnut
producer, with an annual crop of between I.Sm and 2m tons.
Since 1973, however, output has been extremely low, for
various reasons: drought, pests, viruses, smuggling, and
switching land to yams and maize for local consumption. No
groundnuts have been exported since 1975 and local crops are
milled at villag«? presses. In 1980 production had fallen to
377,000 tens, down almost 50% from the previous year.
Gotten output picked up in the mid-1970 's with the
ending of drought conditions in the north where 90% of
Nigerian cotton is grcwn. Between 1974 and 1977 cotton rose
from 3C,000 tons to €1,000 tons, and ranked Nigeria third
among African producers. By 1979 output had fallen tc 41,000
tons and presently, Nigeria cannot meet its demand for rhe
domestic textile industry.
Production of palm produce has been steadily declining
in recent years. Improved producer prices helped to raise
output of palm kernels by- 15? in 1978 and by another 5% in
1979, but Nigeria has now become an importer of palm oil.
Government aid is scheduled for this section of agriculture
through a plantation rehabilitation program.
Nigeria is the second largest rubber producer in Africa.
90% cf its output cones from smallholdings, although large
scale plantation projects are being encouraged. Production
is increasingly being absorbed by dones-cic tire and footwear
industries and exports are cow very small.
Subsistence food crops (mainly maize, sorghum, taio,
yams, cassava, rice and millet) are generally cultivated in
conjunction with and in the same area as crops for local and
export use. Nigeria also grows sugar cane, coffee, beans,
peas, wheat., sesame seed, bananas, zaa, oranges and ether
citrus fruits. Soya bean production is being revived with
investments of NIOOm scheduled. Sugar cane produc-ion is
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also fc€ing stimulated but progress on the government's ambi-
tious expansion programs has been slow, and domestically
produced sugar is expensive. It is impossible to maki* an
accurate measurement of subsistence output. The peasant mode
of production , characterized by smallholdings, simple tech-
niques, and bush fallow system of cultivation, is certainly
the basis of the Nigerian agricultural system for both
export and domestic ccmmodities. Besides the peasant farm
units there are new forms of farm organizaricn which
increasingly constitute the growing points of the sector, zo
include plantations and farm settlement schemes. The one
positive no-^e is that Nigeria is largely self-sufficient in
meat products and it exports hides and skins. A prcject for
tsetse fly eradication in the south is under way and a
program for livestock improvement has been approved.
Nigerian agriculture was growing at an average annual
rate of 7.8X between 1970 and 1974, but by 1976 this growth
had declined to only one percent, recovering slightly to
U. 2% in 1S78-1979 (against cveral growth of 5 . 5?J) . The
sector is seriously ailing, with a dramatic decline in most
export crcps and the food impcrt bill soaring. The govern-
ment recognizes that there is an urgant need -o modernize
techniques and increase yields, and also to close the
rapidly widening gap between farmer's income and urban
wages. A number of large scale agricultural development
projects' have been started which are aimed at producing much
needed food crops like rice and wheat as well as ccttcn for
industry. Nine river basin authorities were established in
1976 to supervise these and othsr schemes, to develop inte-
grated agricultural development, set up agro-indusrries,
reclaim land, and improve pre ductivity . They involve small
farmers as well as large commercial businesses. There is a
single price fixing authority and seven commodity boards,
which cover cocoa, groundnuts, cotton, palm produce, rubber.
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qrains, and roctcrcps. These boards are responsible for
orqanizirq, on a national basis, the marketing of food and
cash crops for local consumption and processing, and for
guaranteeing local prices to farmers. Producer prices were
increased by 16-20% in 1979 and betwean 12-74% (depending on
the crop) in 1980. Improved credit facilities are available
to the farmers, agricultural companies and co-operatives,
through the Nigerian Agricultural Bank. An agricultural
credit guarantee scheme encourages commercial banks to make
more credit and loans available to the agricultural s-ictor.
In 1976 "Ooeration Feed the Nation", aimed at increasing
domestic focd produ ction, which is falling well behind
demand, with massive guantities of agricultural inputs at
heavily subsidized prices and at encouraging as many indi-
viduals and institutions as possible to become involved in
the growing of food. In January 1980 a short term NlSm
*crash prcgram* was introduced to boost output of crops,
livestock, and fisheries. The "Operation Feed the 'Nation"
scheme was abolished and a "National Council on the Green
Revoluticn" established.
The Fourth National Development Plan allocates 13% of
total public investcent to agricultura. It estimares that
cutput wculd have to increase by 6.5% annually to keep pace
with demand, but does net foresee any likelihood that this
rate can te obtained. Instead it aims for a 4% annual growth
rate, uo from its present one parcent rate.
4. Infrastructure - A significant portion of the Fourxh
National Development Plan deals with the development
of improved infrastructure in Nigeria. Briefly, the
plan allocates N2.4 billion to the development of
:3cwer supplies. Two hydrc-elec trie stations are to be
established along with a thermal plant. In the field
of transport, the emphasis is more on maintenance
.
than en new construction, except in --he rural areas
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where reads have not yet been built. N2 billicn is to
be spent en ccimunicaticns. This is to maintain and
improve existing facilities and add new telephone and
telex lines.
The 1981-1985 Development Plan is clearly designed to widen
Nigeria's economic base. In 1981 the government highlighted
its determination to reduce dependence on the oil -industry
and rejuvenate agriculture, by moving agri-business ventures
from schedule II to schedule III of the Indigenisat ion
Decree. This reduces leguired local participation in agribu-
siness concerns from 60 percent to UO percent. The indigeni-
sation relaxation, particularly as it affects agriculture,
should help stimulate the non-oil sectors of Nigeria's
economy and lead to acre balanced growth.
Nigeria's awareness of the role of the private sector in
the drive towards economic diversification has also bean
highlighted by the Ministry of Industries investment promo-
tion campaign. American enterprises showed particular
interest and as part of Nigeria's effort to promote greater
US investments special attention was given to the implemen-
tation of the Investment Guarantee Agreement concluded
between Nigeria and the US in 197U. As part of the same
drive, arrangements have been concluded to establish two
investment liaison offices in the 'JS.
Overall, the events cf the last year showthat the
Nigerian government appreciates the role of foreign invest-
ment in the economy, is learning to cope with the economic
crisis caused by the countries monocultural dependence on
oil and oil revenues, and is malcing progress on diversifying
the economic base so that Nigeria's economic stability will





In August 1977 Nigeria's trade balance went into deficit
for the first time since the cil boom of 1974. Thsre was,
however, a surplus cf N1,050id for the whole year but this
represented a sharp fall frcni the NU ,058ni surplus of 1974.
The value of merchandise exports rose from N271.6m in 1959
to N5,795iD in 1974, with the rapid rise of petroleum earn-
ings. In 1980 total exports were an estimated N14,077m
while the import bill (N3 58.8m in 1959) had reached an
estimated N9,658ffl. In years of high oil production, the
balance cf trade is in surplus, but when production slumps
exports iray fall belcw imports, which explains th^ trad^
deficit in 1978. Under the 1978-1979 budget, strict import
contrcls (pg.6,para 2) were introduced. These were continued
in the 1975- 1980 budget. Additionally, pre-shipaent inspec-
tion of guality and price of imports is undertaken to curb
ever invoicing by importers as a means of moving cash out of
the country. The effect of these controls and the resurgence
cf exports was to produce a surplus in 1980. In 1981,
however, exports once again dipped far below imports (tied
to the world oil glut).
The growth of petroleum exports has contributed signifi-
cantly to the change in the structure cf exports. In 1959
four traditional comiBCdities - cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil,
and palm kernels contributed about 70^ of total experts,
while petroleum contributed only 1.7%. The share cf crude
petroleum rose to 25.9 percent in 1965 and is now well over
90 percent.
There have also been important changes in the structure
cf imports. The share cf capital goods and raw materials has
:isen frcm 46% in 1959 to about 70% of the total import
till, reflecting the rapid rise of manufacturing industries
and the increased demand for heavy equipment generated by
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capital projects, as well as the growing oil industry.
Consumer durables new account for less than 9% of inports
while foodstuffs make up as high as 20%.
The significant changes in the direction of interna-
tional trade since 1959 have been the decreasing share of
the United Kingdom in both import and export trades of
Nigeria and the corresponding increase in the share of the
EEC countries. Oil purchases by the US have grcwn so much
that it is now Nigeria's largest trading partner (replacing
the UK). OS imports by 1980 represented 46% of Nigeria's
total experts. The US is followed by the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, and the Netherlands, each with 12% of 1980
exports. The UK is still Nigeria's main supplier, with 19^
of all imports in 1980 (compared with 45.3% in 1959) and is
followed ty the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, France,
and the US with 12,10,9 and 8 percent respectively. Nigeria
is a meirter and foucder of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS).
C. PUBLIC FIH1IC2 ASD THE BALANCE OF PAYHENTS
In 1981 the financial year was changed from April-?1arch
to run concurrently with the calendar year, and the period
from April tc December was covered with a nine inonth interim
hudqet. The 1981 estiirates foresaw total federally collected
revenue of N1U,7U5m, recurrent expenditure of N4,8U7.7m,
and federal capital expenditure of N7, 154.1m. The capital
program was to be financed largely from the recurrent budget
surplus, internal, ar d external loans, leaving a budget
deficit of N 1 , 22 7m . Some 13% of capital spending was
earmarked for the agricultural sector and 21''? for industry.





In January 1973, a system of decimal currency was intro-
duced with the naira (N) replacing the Nigerian pound. The
naira, equalling ten old Nigerian shillings, is divided into
100 units called kobo. The naira devalued against gold by 1
percent following the devaluation of the US dollar in
February 1973. The currency has been floating since April
1974.
Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves shot up to $6,U46m
by April 1975, compared with $292m at the end of 1972. The
increase was the result of the rise in oil revenues. lower
oil output led to a fall in foreign exchange reserves and by
September 1S78 they stood at only $960m, less than one
month's import cover. Th sy recovered during 1979, with
higher oil prices, and by September 1980 stood at $9, 766m.
Foreign exchange reserves slumped drastically in 198 1 and
were down to $3, 097m ty the end of the year.
Nigeria's balance of payments, which showed an overall
surplus of N125m in 1975 and of N3,102m in 1974, went into
deficit ir. 1976,1977 and 1978, at the end of which year the
deficit on the current account was $3,786ffl and the overall
deficit $2, 344m. Vastly improved oil revenues contributed to
a current surplus of $1,676ffl in 1979, rising to $2, 915m in
1980.
As oart cf a proposed borrowing program to help finance
capital spending, Nigeria negotiated a $1,000ni seven year
loan on the Euromarket in January 1978, the largest Eurolcan
ever cttained by an African country. In July 1978 Nigeria
souaht a second $1,0C0m Burolcan. This proved more diffi-
cult to obtain because of the deterioration in the balance
of paymen-s and the fact that ihe international banking
community no longer regarded Nigeria as a first class
borrower. Finally, late in 1978, it obtained a $750m loan
from a consortium of 73 international banks and in February
1979 a lean agreement for SI, 126m was signed with a
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ccnsortium of Federal German and Austrian banks, for the
Warri steel project. The. tfarri loan was eventually incorpo-
rated into the untied $75 9m loan package, to which the
international banks involved in the latter agreement added a
further $200m, preferring to lend when there was a "tied"
element to the package.
The cost of external public debt servicing estimated in
the 1979-1980 budget was N358.3m, still very low in relation
to exports.
D. PDTOBE PROSPECTS
Nigeria's economy has been growing rapidly, mainly due
to the oil toom. Nevertheless, there was a definite down-
turn in the economy during 1975-1976, 1978-1979, and in
1982-1983 as oil revenues fell. The earlier rise in oil
revenues had enccuraced a sharp rise in government spending
and of liquidity which, together with "cransport bottlenecks
and large wage increases, combined to produce a high rate of
inflation. The boom had also led to soaring impor-s, partic-
ularly cf luxury gccds. Another contributory factor to
inflation is the cost of maintaining the army with a
projected budget over the next five years of $6.2 billion,
however, large scale demobilization would result in raising
the already dangerously high unemployment level and could
lead to colitical instability.
GDP grew in real terras by 25fi between 1976-1977 and
1979-1980. At 1973-1974 prices, it totalled N14,992.5m in
1976-1977 prices, rose by 8.61 -o N16,285.2ra the following
year, increased OEly slowly in 1978-1979 (reflecting oil
slumps) to N17, 182.2m and reached N 13,740.4m in 1979-1980.
Inflation has been in double figures throughout this period
and was particularly high in 1977-1978, when it reached
30-40'X. Inflation is currently fluctuating between 10-20"'^.
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The civilian government inherited a reasonably healthy
economy, as a result not only of the huge rise in oil
reven-ues but also of the military Government's austerity
measures and s-crenous efforts to improve the management of
the economy. It has to- date continued its predecssor's
economic policies although it has increased the emphasis on
agriculture and is reviewing import curbs and the wage
freeze now in existence. The latter has been replaced by
•guidelines for a return to free collective bargaining*,
with wage increases linked to increases in productivity. The
minimum monthly salary has been raised to N125. Import
resxrictions were lifted on certain items, and the Price
Control Beard was replaced by a more flexible and effective
body, the Price Intelligence Agency. However, the 198 1 oil
slump led to a seris of strict controls and in April 1982
restrictions were imposed on the import of goods which are
also manufactured on a significant scale in Nigeria, The
government was to review all capital projects not already
started and domestic interest rates were increased by 2%.
Nigeria is facing a serious economic crisis. Capital
investment and development are inextricably intertwined with
oil exports and the ever -changing revenue inflow tha- irono-
cultural dependency can lead to. The Fourth National
Development Plan has recognized the uncertainties of
Nigeria's economic future and has laid the groundwork for
diversification and increasing protectionist policies. As a
leader in Sub-Sahara Africa and the key country in the
stability of West Africa the success of Nigeria in the next
five years will be critical to regional growth and




Nigeria in its diversity, presents many opportunities
for examination. Its size, relative wealth, and importance
to African stability make Nigeria a target for a myriad
amount cf speculation, primarily concerning its potential
demise.
Since the Civil War Nigeria has steadily developed, by
trial and error, into a dominant and relatively stable force
in regional and continental economics and politics. While
examining those areas which may create furure change it is
imperative not to forget the strength Nigeria has displayed
in its political evolution, military preparedness, and
economic opportunism. Although still faced with many diffi-
culties in the future it must be remembered that Nigeria has
developed a strong working constiruxion which has yielded
two successful national elections and, despite an oil sensi-
tive economy, has continued to persevere in its adherence to
a thorough, if net overly ambitious, economic plan.
But problems do exist in Nigeria. In large part these
problems are due to a wide ranging cultural diversity and a
turbulent political hisrory which has been manifest in a
violent, often chaotic, fashion resulting in a history riff
with Jihad, coups, and civil war.
The intent of this paper has been to present certain
facets cf Nigerian society today which might drive future
change. Three areas; Islam, ethnicity, and economics were
chosen as the most probable sources of future discontent and
the most likely vehicles for intiating some form of change.





Although largely termed a fundamentalist movement, the
Islam of Nigeria strongly resembles revivalist ircvaments
prevalent in other countries with large Muslim populations.
Ihe emergence of Islam as an alternative revolutionary model
to more secular socialist or nationalist models necessitates
greater understanding of the complexities of Islam and its
impact on society as well as its significance as a way of
life both politically and culturally for over 750 million
Muslims in U7 countries. Onderstanding the dynamics of
Islamic revivalist lovements can assist in accurately
judging their scope, character, and impact.
''
• E§2iY§li§^ Z h Q2ii£§£ l2I Chancre
On January 16, 1S79, the shah, Mohammad Eeza
Pahlavi, was forced from his throne and country for the
second, and lasr time. What had bsgun, in earnest, fourteen
months before [95] culminated in the return of Ayatcllah
Khomeini from exile and his vow to institute an Islamic
republic. The fourteen months between 1977 and 1979 can be
seen as a transformative event. Shi'ite preaching had been
honed into an effective technique for maintaining a high
lavel of consciousness about the injustice of the Fahlavi
regime. As the varicus sectors of society increasingly felt
their interests take second priority to those of the indus-
trial wcrld, pressure against the government grew. As the
Iranian government, increasingly, came to rely on foreigners
(Drimarilv U.S.) both for labor and technical advice, one
group after another was alienated and embittered. The voice
of the oi::po3ition became that of Islam. The demand was for
the shah's removal and a reordering of the national priori-
ties. Thus, "The causes of the revolution, and its timing,
were econcmic and political; the form of the revolution, and
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its pacing, ow€d much to the tradition of religious
protest." r 56]
"Historically, the most important consequence of the
revolution may prove to be the rise of religion as a signif-
icant international political fores. Blending theocratic
ideology with mob power on a sustained basis offers an
alt-srna-^ive revoluticrary model to supplement Marxist and
other paradigms. It is a way to replace the authority and
legitimacy cf a monarch or ether secular leadar with another
kind of power based on a different justification.
Tactically, it accciplishes its aim wi-hout resorting to
massive sustained violence. In this case the fundamentalists
proved that even a powerful armed force can be destroyed
from within. The most disturbing element about Khomeini's
Islamic movement was not its doctrine but its effective
mobilization of a diverse sociexy into a political organi-
zation supporting a religious gcvernment. Clerical supremacy
as asserted by Khomeini, is an implicit standing challenge
to secular governments everywhere." [97]
The Iranian Revolution is,
_
perhaps, the most
dramatic episode in a series of episodes which mark a
notable increase in the activities and influence of Muslim
crganizaticns. [98] This phenomenon, which M.E. Yapp, a
noted Islamic scholar, has termed contemporary Islamic re-vi-
valism represents the widespread rejection of the secularist
(inherently Western) path of historical development and is
net jus- c matter of a few apisodas which can be explained
as special events.
Hew do we explain Islamic revivalism and what
constitutes the basis for a revivalist movement? These two
guestions trust be answered if wa are to understand the
forces which are driving the modern Islamic world, and if we
are tc attempt tc anticipate similar episodes in the future.
Therefore, finding a satisfactory explanation for the
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phenomenon of Islamic revivalism is a matter of practical
importance.
Several explanations have been advanced. The phencm-
enon has heen explained in terms of the pecularities of
Islam, its primitive nature and its association with early
empires. It has been argued that the nature of the geograph-
ical environment in which Islam arose and the important rcle
played ty nomadic pastora lists in its history and their
relations with towns has stimulated social and political
behavior of a character unlike that of other systems. The
egalitarian character of Islam seems to have made a suitable
vehicle fcr the radical enthusiasms of modern men. Ancther
interpret ction has been in terms of a distinctive reaction
to the West. It has been argued that the Muslim world
suffered longer and mere profoundly from the Western intru-
sion than did other civilizations. The phenomenon has also
been acccunted for by reference to the concept of the rejec-
tion of intellectuals, that is that Muslims who sought to
become assinilated tc the West found themselves spurned and
in disgust angrily returned to their own traditions. It has
also been suggested that the apparent deficiencies of
Sestern colitical, economic, social and intellectual systems
have induced Muslims to lock back to the sources of Islam
for an alternative modal. Other explanations center around
the discovery of oil in the least developed Muslim coun-
tries, and the desire of other Muslims to adopt a more
orthodox demeanor tc gain favor with these oil producing
nations. Finally, Kuslim revivalism has been explained as
an opportunity fcr unpopular rulers to deflect criticism by
inducing pi^ty.
These explanations possess some elements of truth,
but none seems comprehensive enough to account fcr the char-
acter and the extent cf the Muslim Revivalist movement. This
paper subscribes to the explanation that Muslim revivalism
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is a result of the process cf modernization as distingui-
shable frcm westernization, two terms which seem to be used
interchangeably.
a. The Westernization of Islam
Inherently bound up in the Islamic revivalist
movements is the notion of Westernization and Western intru-
sion. The Western intrusion of Islam existed well before the
contemporary Muslim movements and well before the process of
modern izaticn.
The encounter between the West and Islam began
with the rise of Islam. For a thousand years Islam had th^
test cf exchanges with Europe^ but m the 17th century the
tide began to turn and, since the 18th century, the
Europeans have made considerable advances at the expense of
the Muslims. Conquest, political influence, economic
investment, and intellectual dominance have marked the path
cf Western crogress. With this passage of Western culture
into the Muslim world also came the European missionaries,
endeavoring to replace Islam with Christianity.
Msliffl reaction to this Western intrusion took
three tasic forms:
1. Muslims who were primarily impressed by ^he political
threat posed by Europe proposed to remodel their
institutions in a Western manner. The Ottoman
reformers where an example of this form of reaction.
In attempting to remodel their institutions they
effectively adopted the first process in the Western
concept of secularization - Islam lost its public
function and became a system of personal belief. In
many Muslim states armies became the fccus of this
reformist movesient and were the leading promoters of
a more secularist pattern.
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2. The second reaction was one of outright rej<?ction.
This was the attitude of both orthodox ulema and Sufi
orders everywtere. For the most part this rejection
asserted that the institutions of Islam were derived
frcm God and could not be changed. It was a non-
violent rejection except in certain areas where
violent opposition arose to counter modernizing
Muslim qovernments. The violent episodes, it- seems,
frequently tock place in the remoter areas of the
Islamic world. [99] It was in the remoter areas that
Islam waged its battle en two fronts. Firsr, to th^
West, Islam presented a negative force opposing the
spread of Christianity. Secondly, to pagans located
in the remote areas of Africa and the Middle East, it
offered an attractive model of political and social
crgarization. It was on the second front that Islam
made its greatest gains at the expense of the West.
3. The third reaction was that of compromise. It is
associated with the Islamic modernists, a name given
to various individuals and groups who have sought to
reconcile Islau with modernity. In appearance, Islamic
modernism seemed to graft Western processes or tc the
Islamic Shari'a (code cf law) . it served tc reconcile
both Islam and Western modernization and Islam and
customary law. The weakness of Islamic modernism was
that the greater the inroads which it made into
Muslim institutions the more it appeared as an
Islamic cover on a Western modal. To those Muslims
who rejected all forms cf Western influence it became
more and mere difficult to avoid confrontations.
t. The Impact of Modernization
A distinctive feature of all these reactions was
their limitation to elite groups. [100] The mass cf the
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psople in the Muslim world were little affected by the
Western intrusion and continued to lead a life that was
changed very slightly by the events occuring around them.
"The alteration in the lives of the masses cama in conse-
quence of the modernization process of the later 20th
century rather than as a result of the Western impact of the
19th and early 20th century." [101]
todemization in the Muslim world took a charac-
teristic fcrin. Politically, it was marked by an increase in
the power of government. Economically, it was heralded by
the decline in the relative importance of agriculture, the
rise of industry and services, and the shift of people from
countryside to towns. Socially, it was exhibited in the
proliferation of communications, the growth of mass educa-
tion and the weakening of the traditional compartmentaliza-
tion of society. Mcdernizaticn resulted in an increase in
population and a growing internal and external threat to the
states. The principal agencies of modernization were the
states themselves and, "It was modernization, mosr conspicu-
ously in the form of urbanization, which involved the masses
and led to the formation of a reaction different from those
of the 19th and early 20th century elites. Therefore, In
response to the question, "Is the phenomenon of contemporary
Muslim revivalism new?" The answer is yes. The invovleraent
of the masses in politics via modernization is an unprece-
dented event in the Islamic world," [102] This response
gives rise to a second quest.ion, "In what ways has the
involvement of the masses changed the character of political
life in Muslim countries? The answer is that the participa-
tion of the masses in political life, in the Muslim world,
has tended to make politics acre Islamic." [103]
Traditional Islam was seen as a synthesis of
religicr. and politics. Modernization destroyed the tradi-
tional divisions between politics and religion by assuming
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the functions previcusly relegated to the ulama. This
encroachment apon the power of the ulama by the governnient,
resulted in a confrontation between church and state.
Initially, the ulama wished only to regain the authority
which the government had ursurped. Later, they wanted to
contrcl the very apparatus of state. As Yapp states, "The
effect of the first stage of secularization (the transfer of
the public functions of religion to the state) was to polit-
icize religion." [104]
The consequence of this politicization of
religion was the organization of the ulama into various
pressure groups to gain or regain their traditional func-
tions and to represent religion in the governmental decision
making process. The ulama quickly laarned that their power
and often their income were dependent upon the apparatus of
state and their aim was to control that state.
The process of modernization also affected the
attitudss of the masses. In traditional societies they felt
little ocmpulsioc to achieve a political identity because
such identities had little impact on a situation where power
was so widely dispersed through society. Modernization,
"Represented especially by the concentration of political
power in the hands of the state, and by urbanization,
cblic€d the masses to choose a political identity: in Muslim
countries the choice of the masses has often been a Muslim
identity. The Muslim identity is, perhaps, the single iden-
tity which is transferable from the traditional, rural envi-
ronment, to the modern urban situation and, therefore, of
peculiar significance to the new urban immigrant." [105]
As modernization proceeds, the new urban immig-
rant becomes more involved in ths political process via
schools, courts, economic activity, -he army, or improved
communications. With increased involvement comes an
increased desire to shape the environment within which they
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earn their livelihood. Frequently, these desires manifest
themselves in the fcim- of demands or assertions, that the
iesterni2ed elita have forsaken the values of Islam, and
that if they had followed the traditional path of behavior
there would fce a more equitable distribution of rewards and
cower. Most of these politically active masses have an
unclear picture of the exact nature of the type of Islaiic
qovernment they want. They are equally confused abcu-^^ the
role of the ulama in the government. They are unsure whether
ulama shculd be watchdogs over govarnmBnt or participants in
it. For the most part these masses, which form the Muslim
revivalist parties, are more concerned with practical action
than with tjhiloscphical consistency, vi v a vis, Shari'a law.
c. Revivalist Movements
"The differences between the n 9W parties or
lovements of Muslim revivalism and former groups are
ST:rikinq. The new parties are movements of the masses, not
the elites. They are composed of new urban men, not tribal
or agrarian or eld bazaar men, although the last provide
useful support. Their leaders are not normally from the
traditional elites. The movements are uncompromisingly
modernist. Unlike the older modernists, they are essentially
political icvements, rot social, and they are not concerned
with intellectual compromise; they are strictly traditional
in their formulations and modern in rheir practice and they
care little for the resulting contradictions. To the
orthodox, they sprout heresy at every pore. They do not draw
en the traditional Sufi orders, but prefer to create their
own organizations." [106] In this respect, an important
aspect of the new urban groups is that Islam has become the





As a conclusion to the theory that Muslim rovi-
valism is primarily a result of modernization, and more
specifically, urbanization, four factors which will affect
the success or failure of revivalist movements are
presented:
1. If the existing elite is sufficiently strong and
united and maintains control of a powerful coercive
force it can successfully resist the attacks of the
revivalists. Democratic political systems also seera
to resist revivalism better than autocratic systems.
A democratic system can more easily call in the
silent majority in the countryside. Also, it obliges
revivalism to compete with other ideologies and to
expose its own contradictions to the test of polit-
ical debate. A democratic system may find it easier
to accommodate religicus demands than an autocratic
system, which fears to make accommodations lest
concessions be taken as a sign of weakness.
2. The strength of the revivalists is influenced by the
extent of Islamizaticn in tha traditional society:
revivalism requires the existence of a tradition
which can be revived. If no strong Islamic tradition
has existed in the past, or if Islam has not been
widely accepted then revivalism will be weakened and
opposition may be created among those who are only
partially Islaicizsd. Bevivalism's strength is also
affected by its organization and leadership. If the
revivalists can find leaders among the crthodox
ulema, then revivalism may find it easier to win
acceptance than if it is obliged to find lead-;3 from
outside the established elites.
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3. The economic situation is also a significant factor.
Economic deprivation alone seems inadaquate as a
basis for revolution but, a sudden downturn after
prosperity may strongly affecx those urban groups
which form the revivalists* main rc-cruiting
grounds. These recruits are primarily working age men
who have either lost their jobs or who cannot find
jobs after migrating to the urban areas.
4. Finally, Islanic revivalism tends to draw its support
from exactly the same new urban groups as the radical
secular parties, socialist or nationalist. This may
suggest a new type of revolutionary model which will
grew relative to the degree of success Islamic move-
ments attain.
In the final analysis contemporary Islamic revivalism may
only be a means of mediation between old and new - a phenom-
enon which, "need net be resisted but simply observed."
ri07] However, The history of Islam has always been cr.e of
change and adaptatici and, more recently, it has been a
history cf violent and revolutionary change. The Iranian
episode is a clear indication that revivalism is a force to
contend wirh and tie new wave of violence in northern
Nigeria may be setting the stage for more dramatic events to
come
.
Islam seems to provide an excellent medium for
change in predominantly Islamic countries and Nigeria sesns
beset with all the problems which have spawned past revi-
valist movements to include, rural migration, high unemploy-
ment, class stratification, corruption, outside economic
control, and a dissident internal faction building around a
disgruntled student population and irate young men frus-
trated at the lack cf opportunity for social and economic
advancement. However, despite the riots which occurred in
1980 and 1982 Islam seems poorly equipped to provide an
engine for significant change in Nigeria.
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By tracing the rise of Islam in Nigeria, as was
done in Chapter Three, we find that Islamic history has
travelled through several stages. Beginning with its rise
as an important social reform movement in the 19th century
it gained control over large parts of west Africa. However,
Islam began to wane as a political force during Nigeria's
colonial occupation although it con~inued to grow as a
religion. The spirit of the . early reformists had died
completely by the time of the second generation emirs.
Colonial policies fostered the decline of Islam,
and as a political force it was only briefly active in 195U
when Nigerian Muslims pressed for and won a battle to estab-
lish the Muslim Court of Appeal, an institution unique in
the Islamic world.
The establishment cf the Muslim Court of Appeal
was promulgated for two reasons. One, to determine the posi-
tion of Maliki law in the future of Nigeria. Two, to insure
that non-Muslim groups in northern' Nigeria were net forced
to live under the imposition of Islamic law after Nigeria
gained independence.
Eventually, the Muslim Court of Appeal evolved
into the Shari'a Court of Appeal, an institution whose -rxis-
tence wrouaht havoc in the Constitutional Conference
drafting the 1979 Nigerian Ccnstiturion. However, -he early
period of its existence was hampered by two major obstacles.
One, th€ high court relied upon a panel of assessors
appointed independently of the panel of judges serving on
the Muslim Court of Appeal and frequently, the panel of
assessors and tha judges found theoiselves at odds in their
interpretation of Maliki Law. Two, nhere was no guarantee
that a judgement correct by Muslim law would ever be upheld
by the judicial system. Fears of Muslims that their laws
would be destroyed by the "English" courts were rampant.
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The institution of the Muslim Court of Appeal
offered some evidence that Muslims in Nigeria were adaptive
tut correspondingly unwillingly to give up the tenets of
their religion.
At independence, Islam had ceased to exist as a
political force, although, in the northern portions of
Nigeria teing Muslim was usually a, prerequisite for any type
of political aspiriations.
By 1980 Islam was practically forgotten as a
potential moblizing agent. However, the Iranian revolution
and the ensuing Nigerian riots focusad attention on a poten-
tially vclitale situation.
In fact, Islam in Nigeria is not revivalist fcut
it may be providing an alternative revolutionary model for
some segments of society. In that respect, on a very local-
ized basis, it is a potentially violent engine for change.
Khat Islam has become, in Nigeria, is a religion and not a
way of life. It has lost the dynamism which infected the
19th centurv Ji*hadists and it has become, like Christianity,
a facer of social and cultural obligation. Politically, it
cffers little more than a credential for potential office
holders who seek election in predominantly Islamic states
within Nigeria.
It is never wise to predict the course of future
events, tut in Nigeria, it seems safe to anticipate that
Islam, whill9 providing a potential mobilizing agent for
localized reform does not possess the necessary strength,
history, or committment to challengs the structure of
Nigeria's emerging national institutions.
E. ZIHHICITY AID CHABGE
Many books have been written discussing the role of
ethnicitv in the development of Nigeria and Chapter Two of
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this paper, while tracing the evolution of Nigeria's polit"
ical history, also provides the history of the evolution of
ethno-raqional politics. It has become synonomous when
discussing the rise cf the Nigerian nation to also discuss
the concurrent rise of ethnic politics.
By obrective in these concluding remarks is to point out
several factors which may be leading to the demise of ethnic
politics in Nigeria, and because of that demise a corre-
sponding change in Nigerian politics is being spawned.
The return cf jukwu, as discussed in Chapter Four,
represents a strong move towards eroding ethno-regional
biases. Ojukwu's sutseguent announcement on 14 January,
1983, that he was joining the NPN further served to fester,
as he stated, "The ccaaing together of two formerly an^^agcn-
istic groups in the country." [108]
More significantly, the 1979 Constitution is a document
which suppresses ethno-regionalism and reinforces the tenets
cf a strong central government. By law, it provides for a
widely representative body of delegates to its political
institutions, gives the president strong powers, and ensures
that nationally elected officers have a representative vote
from all Nigerians. It is a wall constructed document
written from the experience of many failures. Its success
can be measured by the conduct of two national elections in
four years and the endurance of its institutions based not
on military power but on the veracity of its own
construction.
As further evidence that ethnicity may be on the war.e in
Nigeria %e have witnessed two national elections, one in
1979 and the other in 1983. at a national level the
elections were isarred by various protest concerning voter
registration, the conduct of FEDECO, and the registration of
political parties. However, the constitution has withstood
the many protests and held in office those men elected by
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the will of the majority. These two elections harbinge a
changing reality in Nigeria. The course of change in future
politics is beginning to ride on the strength of national
parties, cross ethnic candidates, and integrated
constituencies.
Of course, while national elections are slowly eroding
the dynamics of ethno-regional politics, within states it is
safe to bet that ethnicity is a key ingredient for
successful candidacy. Hence, it is probably unlikely that
any tut an Ibo could be elected in the eastern portion of
Nigeria, however, the current of change may be moving wi-hin
states also, as a sticng bid tc create up to twenty-nine new
states has been accepted in the national houses. [109] While
the creation of these new states will present many problems
within Nigerian politics they will certainly provide a wider
range of ethnic participation at the national level.
Bowever, at the local and state lavel new states creation
could be expected to create stronger ethnic political ties
due tc smaller state units based on ethnic homogeniety.
Therefore, for example, while the Tiv represent a large
minority vcte in eastern Nigeria, by creating a new state
they would dominant the central eastern section of Nigeria
and ccnseguently create an ethnically dominated state where
none existed before.
In sum, while ethnicity continues to play a significant
role in Niqerian politics several forces are at work to
lesson its impact. It is these forces, the 1979
Constitution, the creation of new states and broad based
political parties which hold the key to much cf Nigeria's
future charge. The survival cf democratic politics in
Nigeria is providing an excellent medium for changing the
political and social climate cf that country.
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C. ECOHOHICS AID CHAIGE
Chapter Five of this paper provided a fairly detailed
outlook into Nigeria's economy, the problems of the national
development plan, and Nigeria's plight as a victim of the
oil sycdrcme. Nigeria's economic problem can be summed up
rather quickly. Nigeria needs to diversify; in order to
diversify she must have funds; to get funds she must pump
oil to capacity. Therefore, when Nigeria can't pump oil to
capacity (which it has not done since about 197 7-1978) it
can't get enough funds to diversify, and without diversifi-
cation Nigeria remains a stagnant, monocultur ally oil depen-
dent economy, sensitive to the whims of a highly erratic
world oil demand.
Nigeria's oil dependency has created many problems, as
discussed in Chapter Five, however, paramount among these
problems is the human tragedy; rapid urban migration, high
unemployment, and corruption at all levels. With oil has
come a rapid yet distinct class stratification and the world
of the "haves" is all too far removed from the world of the
"have nots." Relative deprivaxion both regionally and socie-
tally is in full swing in Nigeria.
Paramount among these many problems is the high unem-
ployment created by rapid urban migration. Where once close
to 90 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture
now only about 50 percent of the population pursues that
source of livelihood. Tragically, the largest portion of
those who left the farms for greener pastures in the fast
growing urban sprawls remain out of work. Concurrently,
students graduating from universities are finding job place-
ment next to impossible and within their ranks lie the
potential leaders for extreme social change.
The management or mismanagement of the Nigerian national
economy has become the root cause of the presen- political
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tension in the ccuntry. Nigeria has failed to live within
its available economic resources as it fails to produce
while consuming the produce of mors industrialized nations.
1983 was the crucial election year in Nigeria and the
key election campaigr issues were the economy and states
creation. In dealing with the current economic mess the
federal government with all of its resources must drasti-
cally restructure the economy and meaningfully diversify so
that petroleum dependency can be substantially reduced.
In sum, the Nicerian economy cannot be a medium for
change. Ey itself, it cannot generate social or political
environments favorable to revitalization. However, the
economy certainly provides the impetus for change as
projects fail, unemployment soars, and corruption and infla-
tion rise at egually rapid rates. The people will seek ways
to institute change and the engine of that char.ge may the
the unemployed masses which now roam the streets of
Nigeria's cities.
D. FIHALIY
In rctal this paper has evaluated in some detail Three
potential mediums for change in Nigeria; Islam, ethnicity,
and the eccncmy. While Islam and ethnicity have each played
a role in the dynauics of Nigeria's evolution it is the
condition cf the economy which may fo3*er the growth of
future unrest in Nigeria. However, on a national scale the
conclusion is that the best hope for future development and
constructive change lies in the framework of the 1979
Constitution and the leadership of the national poli-cical
partie.s.
While Islam, ethnicity, and economics can spawn crises
they cannot sustain lasting change. The fu-ure of social
change is inherently bound up in a governmental system which
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appears tc be working and which must continue to find ways
to assuaqe its massive population while gaining control of
an economy whose fragility is markad by the rise and fall of
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The 1979 Constitution was brought into forca by the FMG
as an ordinary decree, entitled the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree 1978, No. 25,
talcing effect on 1 October, 1979. In a departure from the
British antecedents, the new law adop-ed features cf the
United States Constitution - The establishment of a govern-
mental system predicated on a popularly elected president at
the head cf a strong executive branch and a separate bicam-
eral legislature.
In addition to granting numerous personal freedoms and
the recognition that sovereignty resides in the people, the
constitution also ccntinues the practice of distributing
powers between federal and state authorities by means of a
list enunerating where the federal government is to have
sole competence and a concurrent list of subjects on which
both the federal and state authorities may legislate
(federal law prevails over state law in the event cf incon-
sistency) .Fewer over unlisted matters is retained by the
states. In conformity with a longterm tendency to aggregate
powers at the federal level, the exclusive list contains
sixty-six items coipared to forty-four under the 1963
constitution. Control over the census, arms, and prisons are
among these matters shifted to the national level. The
federal government also retains exclusive power over
defense, immigration, external affairs, banking and
currency, regulation cf trade, price controls, agricultural




Areas on the concurrent list in which states may legis-
late (subject to federal predcminance in case of conflict)
are the allocation of revenues, collection of ^axes, elec-
tric power, and industrial and agricultural development.
Primary. education is the responsibility of the states and
local governments.
An impcrtant distinction is that under the new
Constitution the federal government sets the rate and
collects state taxes, which are then remitted to the states.
Other revenues collected by the federal government, notably
the substantial mineral royalties, mining rents, and direct
profits of the Nigerian National Pstroleum Company (NNPC)
,
go into a single Federation Account, to be distributed, among
federal, state", and local governments on a pro rata basis,
as determined by periodic enactments of -he National
Assembly. The vesting of these powers in the National
Assembly enhances the authority of the federal government,
which extends to the assignment of certain revenues directly
to local councils without consulting state authorities.
Onder the Nigerian system the states do not have indi-
vidual constitutions; rather their structures are delineated
within the national Constitution. State governments are
based on an executive model closely conforming to that of
the federal government. Executive authority is vested in a
governor while legislative power is bestowed on a single-
house legislature. The states have responsibility for estab-
lishing local goverEiaent authorities, subject to the
stipulations in the constitution as to how local governments
are to be organized and the functions that are to be
conferred on them. The Constitution outlines special proce-
dures for legislaticn creating new states, which must be
preceded by a request supported by two-thirds of the members
of the Senate and House representing the area, the state
assembly, and local councils of the area, followed by a
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referendum of the people in the area and approval hj rhe
Senate and House by a two-thirds majority.
The Constitution may be amended by a two-rhirds majority
of all memters of both houses of the national legislature,
in addition to approval by resolution of the legislative
bodies cf two-thirds of the states. The fundamental rights
chapter together with the legislative process for creating
new states form a special category that can only be amended
by four-fifths majority of all members of the national
legislature plus approval by two-thirds of the state bodies.
While the Nigerian political framework bears a marked
resemblance to the federal system of the United States, the
institutions the republic has adopted carry the imprint of
its cwn unigue experiences and needs. The president is
intentionally delegated strong executive powers. Special
conditions attached tc his election are intended to insure
that he will be more than a regional candidate, while his
cabinet must, by constitutional direction, include ministers
representing all nineteen states.
In spite of his wide authority the president cannot
govern effectively without collaboration of the directly
elected Senate and House of Representatives of the National
Assembly, which must apprcve his legislative program and
budget. The task was not made easier in the post 1979
government by the fact that five parties were represented in
the two legislative bodies, while the governing Nar:ional
Party of Nigeria (NPN) did net command a majority in either
house. A system of standing and conference committees has
evolved, following the American pattern, before which minis-
ters and officials can be called upon to appear.
The Constitution provides for an intricate alloca*:icn of
powers between the nineteen state governments and the
federal gcvernaent that overlap in several sensitive ar='as.
The issue of state authority versus federal government
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control has accordingly been the source of much political
skirmishing since the new state governments, only sev^n of
which were wholly in the hands of Shagari's NPN, were
installed in October 1979. A key element of federal-state
relations, the allocation of revenues, including ths surging
oil income. was left by the constitutional authors to be
decided by the National Assembly. The formula adopted,
assigning less than a third to the states and an additional
10 percent to local government, has been bitterly contested
by most state governors. Nonetheless, the state shares are
by far the largest source of state incomes.
Hithin the Federal Government, the Constitution sets
forth, in detail, respective roles of the separate execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches. Still, many prac-
tical prctlems emerced as the executive branch and -he
legislature sought to accustom themselves to interacting
within an unfamiliar structure with few precedents to fall
back on. Added complications were the presence of five
parties in the National Assembly and the lack of a majority
by Shagari»s NPN, necessitating a working alliance with the
Nigerian People's Party (NPF) that did not function
smoothly. It is, therefore, somewhat of an accomplishment
that the tasic legislative program cleared the National
Assembly in 1980 with serious delays only over budget
appropriations.
1. The Executive Eranch : The president and vice presi-
dent, whose names appear on the same electoral
ballot, are directly elected by the people. Ihe
President serves as head of state, head of govern-
• ment , and commander in chief of the armed forces. His
term is four years, and he may be elected for a
second but not a third term. It was intended by the
Constitution that the president would exercise strong
direction over the federal government with his powers
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bounded by a system of checks and balances provided
by an independent legislature and judiciary.
Nevertheless, a considerable measure of cooperation
and restraint was foreseen as indispensible particu-
larly during the early stages of introducing a form
cf government new to Nigeria. la a summit meeting of
the heads of the five parties called by Shagari in
January 1980, agreement was reached on the need for
such cooperation and for a continuing dialogue among
party leaders. Interparty relations remainsd good,
although meetiEgs at the top party level were not
regularized, owing partly to the animosity of Awclcwo
of the Onity Party cf Nigeria (DPN) toward Shagari
and his persistent unwillingness to acknowledge the
leqitimacy of Shagari's election, based on what
Awclowo considered unfair election results in 1979.
The size of the president's executive council (cabinet)
is not prescribed in the Constitution, nor are the minis-
tries designated. The president is, however, required to
name an attorney general and to name at. least one citizen of
each of the nineteen states to his cabinet. The first
cabinet cf the 1979 government had twenty-four ministers, of
whom nineteen were from the President's NPN, while five were
from the cooperating NPP. Cabinet ministers may not be
members o 1 the National Assembly but are obliged to attend
sessions of either house if invited to do so when matters
pertinent to their ministries are discussed. Ministers have
also apoeared before committees along with the director of
the budget to explain and defend appropriations for their
departments. In spite of the presence of several influential
political figures, the cabinet leaned toward technocratic
appointees, and at the same time reflected the need not only
to include members frcm each cf the nineteen states but also
to orovide some ethnic balancing.
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The executive branch incorporates inputs from nine ether
federal fccdies, some exercising powers independent of the
president and some whose functions are only advisory. The
most senior of these is the Council of State composed of the
president and vice president, former presidents, the presi-
dent of the Senate and speaker of the House, state gover-
nors, and members appointed by st£.te councils of chiefs. The
Council of State advises the president on such matters as
the census, the award of national honors, appointments to
ether executive bodies, and the maintenance of public order.
The Council of State is the only public body at the national
level where the traditional rulers-emirs, obas, and onis
(kings)- are represented. Although it met only three tines
in the new government's first year, the Council had symbolic
importance as the linking element between the still influen-
tial traditional leadership and the national government.
The Federal Civil Service Commission and the Police
Service Commission have powers of appointment to these
services, while the Judicial Service Commission advises the
president on senior appointments to the bench. The president
is chairian cf the National Defense Council and the National
Security Council, concerned with external defense and public
security, respectively. The vice president chairs the
National Eccnomic Council, which includes the state gover-
nors as members and functions as ^he coordinating body for
econciric planning at the different levsls of government. The
Federal Electoral Commission (PEDECO) , an independent body
with a member from each state, organizes elections, regis-
ters voters, and registers and supervises political parties.
The National Population Commission, also with one member
from each state, is responsible for the census, birth and
death registration, and advising the president on Sub-Sahara
Africa's largest population. While the president has power
to appoint members cf these bodies (except those who are
me

desigDat€d in the Cccstitution on the basis of official
positions they hold) , the appointments must be confirmed by
the Senate. The appointees are somewhat insulated frgm
political pressures ty the fact tha-c they hold office for
five-year terms and can be removed by the president only
with support of two-thirds of the Senate.
The Constitution also permits the president to appoint
special advisors with no restriction as to numbers. Shagari
has named nine of these special assistants. Som? are
personal confidants of Shagari, while others have been
chosen for their professional qualifications or tc provide
ethnic balance.
Permanent secretdries-senior civil servants usually
entrusted with day-to-day operating responsibilit^s for
government ministries- play a vital role in the administra-
tion of the executive branch. Shagari has raappointed the
twenty-three permanent secretaries of the military govern-
ment, while reshuffling their responsibilities, and added
eight more.
Early in his term Shagari created another category
within the executive branch by naming presidential liaison
officers to each of the eighteen states outsida of Lagos,
purportedly tc oversee federal projects in the states and
act as the federal government's link with the state gover-
nors. These posts, net mentioned in the Constitution, were
distributed to NPN politicians. Shagari's action was
bitterly criticized by the opposition parties and was not
supported by the cooperating NPP on the grounds that ths
president was seeking to circumvent the authority of state
governments in order to reward NPN party workers with lucra-
tive posts. The opposition governors have boycotted the
liaiscn officers, reducing their effectiveness in states
where the NEN has not been the governing party.
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2. Th€ Legislature: Responsibility for legislative
action rests with the National Assembly, consistirig
of a Senate with five members from each state for a
total of ninety-five, and a House of Repressnta rives
with 4U9 members (One additional seat is reserved for
the future capital of Abu ja) . Each of the nineteen
states is divided into five senatorial districts, as
well as a larcer number cf House districts, each with
roughly 100,000 registered voters. The largest House
delegation (46 seats) is from Kano state, and the
smallest (10 seats) is from Niger state. The assembly
sits for four years, after which elections for both
houses are held on dates set by FEDECO.
The two bodies elect their own leaders. Under the agree-
ment worked out by the NFN-NPP majority coalition, the
offices cf ^resident of the Senate and deputy speaker of the
House were reserved for the NPN; those of speaker of the
House and deputy president of the Senate were offered tc the
NPP. The assembly is required to remain in session for at
least 181 days each year.
Either house of the assembly may originate a bill.
Proposed legislation is subject to review by one of the
standing committees in each house. Although only one of
these-the Joint Committee on Finance- is stipulated in the
Constitution, twenty-seven ccmmittees have been established
in the House and twenty-two in the Senate. Twenty-five
members are assigned to each House committee and eleven to
each Senate committee. Lacking regular meeting places,
staffs, and other resources, most of the committees have yet
tc play a major part in rhe legislative process. Enactment
of a bill reguires approval cf both houses plus assenr of
the president. The president has thirty days in which to
signify his aporoval. If the president fails to approve a
till within this pericd, the bill may still be passed if it
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gains a two-thirds majority of both houses. Special proce-
dures apply- for appropriation bills if, -after twc months
into a financial year, one house has failed to act favor-
ably. The Joint Committee on Finance is then called upcn to
resolve differences. If this step fails, the bill can still
be approved by an affirmative vote in a special joint
sitting of the National Assembly.
3. The Judiciary: The Nigerian judicial system has
retained many British legal practices and forms. Laws
enacted in Nigeria before independence at the
regional or national level continued to be in force
after 1960, as did the relatively few laws extending
to overseas territories. The few British statutes
that extended to Nigeria and remained in force after
independence have, in almost all cases, been repealed
or suspended by Nigerian law. During the military
regimes from 1966 to 1979, federal laws were made in
the form of decrees while those at the state level
were in the form of edicts. Another source of the law
applied by Nigerian courts is English common law,
which has been modified by the courts to fit local
circumstances. A distinct Nigerian case law, departing
entirely from the English precedent, covered only a
narrow range of matters by the end of the second
decade of independence. The unwri.tten body of customs
and traditions regulating relationships within ccmmu-
nities in their traditional settings, known as
customary law, is recognized in many states and is
observed by the courts if not repugnant to natural
justice or incompatible with written law. Custcmary
law may be recognized for civil matters, such as
matrimonial, land, and property disputes.
Nigeria has a multi-tiered judicial system. Custcmary




courts and high courts function at the state level, and all
are surmounted by three tiers of federal courts. A distinc-
tive feature is the parallel sharia court system found in
northern states for adjudicating matters of Muslim personal
law. Under the separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers prescribed by the 1979 Constitution, the
Supreme Court of Niceria is autonomous and has in practice
played a substantial role in interpreting the 1979
Constitution's application over the authority of the execu-
tive and l€gislative branches as well as in federal-state
relations.
At th€ federal level the lowest of the three echelons is
the Federal High Court , which is designated to deal with
revenue matters and ether cases of original jurisdiction as
determined by the National Assembly. This court superseded
the federal revenue court of previous governments. • The
Federal Court of Appeal is at an intermediate level between
the state high courts and the Supreme Court. It hears
appeals from the Federal High Court and from state high
courts. A bitter controversy in the Constituent Assembly
over the establishment of a separata Sharia Court of Appeal
on a level with the Supreme Court was settled by stipulating
that, among the fifteen or laore justices plus the chief
justice of ths Federal Court of Appeal, no fewer than three
must t€ learned in Islamic personal law and three learned in
customary law. Appeals from state sharia courts of appeal
are heard fcy the Federal Court of Appeal which for this
prupose is duly constituted if it consists of these three
judges.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in constitu-
tional disputes between the federation and states or between
states, in addition to other matters that the National
Assemtlv may assign to it. It takes appeals from the Federal
Court of Appeal on interpretations of the Constitution on
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civil or criminal matters, on validity of elections and
membership in legislatures, and on death sentences
pronounced or confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal.
In addition to the chief justice, the Supreme Court may
consist, of up to fifteen members. The court sits in panels,
being duly constituted with five judges for original hear-
ings and seven when hearing appeals by states. Federal
judges are appointed by the president on advice of the
Federal Judicial Services Commission. Supreme Court justices
and the chief justice of the Appeal Court are subject ro
Senate confirmation. Independence of the judiciary is
intended to be safeguarded by prohibitions against removal
except on grounds of incapacity or misbehavior supported by
a two-thirds vote of the Senate.
After the return to civilian rule the higher courts were
almost immediately ccnfrocted with numerous demands for
interpretation of the 1979 Constitution on heated issues of
interparty and federal state relations. Decisions by the
courts on these and other major civil rights and constitu-
tional cases have brought credit to the higher bench for
integrity and independence.
The governmental structure at state level closely resem-
bles that established at the national level under the
Constitution. The three branches of government are repre-
sented and separately organized. The executive branch is
headed ty a governor elected to a four year ten on the same
ticket with a deputy governor. To insure a measure of
support throughout the state's area, a winning candidate
must obtain the largest number of votes and also secure
one-fourth of the votes in at least two- thirds of the local
government districts, or a run-off is required.
Unlike the two houses of the National Assembly, each
state has a unicameral legislature called the House of
Assembly under the chairmanship of a speaker elected by -he
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assembly. As with the National Assembly, the state House is
constitutionally obligated to be in attendance 18 1 days each
year. A governor's veto of legislation may be overruled by a
two-thirds vote of the assembly. The FEDECO determines the
boundaries of the state constituencies. Under the
Constitution there must be three times as many seats in the
state legislature as the number of seats allotted to the
state in the federal House of Representatives.
The governor's cabinet, or executive council of the
state, consists of the heads of state departments, known as
commissioners. They Bay not siiultaneously be members of the
House of Assembly although their appointments are subject to
confirmation by that body. Several of the nine federal
executive bodies established by the Constitution have ccunt-
erparts in mandatory bodies at ths state level, to include
the State Council of Chiefs, Civil Service Commission,
Judicial Service Comiission, and the Electoral Commission.
The range of authority of state governments is outlined
in schedules appended to the 1979 Constitution detailing the
areas in which the federal government has exclusive power to
legislate and the areas in which federal and state govern-
ments have concurrent powers. In spite of the conscientious
effort by the authors of the Constitution to demarcate the
respective powers of the federal and state authorities,
acute differences emerged during tha early period of the
second republic, raising fears that state resentment over
percieved federal intrusion would remain a continuing source
of contention. Some of these issues have been resolved by
concessions on the part of the Shagari government
.
Revenue is a )cey issue. During the early years of inde-
pendence the states secured their revenues chiefl'? from
exDort duties and excise taxes, notably those on tobacco and
petrclauffl products. Disparities in this system becaae
pronounced during the 1973-1974 OPEC oil price increase and
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a more equitable means of distribution had to ba devised.
In 1975 the Distributable Pool Account was established to
assign revenues from import and export duties to the states.
Under the 1979 Constitution the Distributable Pool Account
was superseded by the more comprehensive Federation Account
into which all but some minor revenues were to be accumu-
lated. The ultimate allocation among federal, state, and
local authorities was left to the National Assembly.
After months of heated debate a revenue allocation law
was approved in February 1981 assigning 58.5 percent of the
revenues in the Federation Accounr to the federal govern-
ment, 26.5 percent to the nineteen states, 5 percent to the
mineral producing states, and 10 percent to local govern-
ments. While states recieve the proceeds from personal
income and some other taxes, their share of distribution
from the Federation Account is by far the most important
scurce of state revenue.
The systematic reorganization of local government was an
integral part of tke five-stage return to civilian rule
announced in October 1975. Local administration had a
disappointing record since first efforts to introduce
popular participation in the East and West regions a decade
before independence. In the Norxh the colonial system of
indigineocs authorities of emirs and chiefs patterned on the
traditional power structure had been extended through the
first republic. Under the military regime the au-hcrity of
the military leadership was transmitted to the local level
through the assignment of resident or district officers to
supervise the actvities of local councils.
The reorganization of 1976 introduced a uniform single-
tier council structure among all nineteen states. I-'- was
eiimed at bringing experience in self-government to the local
level, especially in the emirate dominated north. The newly
elected local councils were also called upon by the military
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leadership to select delegates to the 1977 Constituent
Assemtly preparatory to the return to civilian rule.
The reforms introduced by the military authorities in
1976 required that the single-tiered local councils be
elected directly cr indirectly (nine adopted direct
elections and ten, indirect) . The councils elect their own
chairmen and make decisions by majority vote. The military
regime granted increasingly large sums of money to -he new
local councils and was determined to install a system that
would avoid the corrupt practices and inefficiency of
earlier Iccal governient models.
The 1979 Constitution lists the local administrative
areas cf each of the nineteen states and requires every
state to provide for democratically elected local government
councils ty enacting laws governing finance, compcsition,
structure, and functions. Ths Constitution also mandates the
participation of local councils in economic development
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